Opinion concerning the Applications for Membership from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway submitted under Articles 237 of the EEC Treaty, 205 of the Euratom Treaty, and 98 of the ECSC Treaty [1 October 1969]. Bulletin of the European Communities. Supplement No. 9/10, 1969 by unknown
ECSC - EEq- EAEC
Opinion concerning the Applications for
Membership from the  United Kingdom,
Ireland, Oenmark and Norway submitted
under Articles 237 of the EEC Treaty,
205  of the Euratom Treaty, and 98 of the
ECSC Treaty
Opinion submitted 1 October 1969
Published as Bulletin of the European Communities
Supplement No. 9/10, 1969.
Blank pages not reproduced: 2 , and 88.
COMMISSIONCONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
TITLE I - ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
Chapter 1  General
Chapter 2  The economic problems
(a) Agriculture
(b) Economic and financial problems
Chapter 3  The practical problems
(a) Problems raised by simultaneity of the applications
(b) Problems involved in actual entry
Chapter 4  Economic integration in Europe
TITLE II  STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY
Chapter 1  The Community s future development
Chapter 2  Strengthening and enlargement
TITLE III  FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 1  General
Chapter 2  Improvements to the functioning of the institutions in the
Community as it  is  today
(a) The Parliament
(b) The Council
(c) The Commission
Chapter 3  The institutions of an enlarged Community
S. 9/10 - 1969
PageTITLE IV - REMARKS ON PROCEDURE
CONCLUSIONS
ANNEX
A. CUSTOMS UNION AND ECONOMIC UNION
Chapter The customs union
(a) New dimensions
(b) Abolition of obstacles to intra-Community trade
(c) Application of the common customs tariff (CCT)
(d) Problems connected with commercial policy
Chapter II  Industrial development
(a) Industrial policy
(i) Establishment of the single market in certain
sectors
(ii) A statute for companies
(ill) Patents
(iv) The structure of industry
(v) Investments by non-member countries
(vi) The special problems of steel
(b) Research and Technology Policy
(i) Recent trend
(ii) New prospects in an enlarged Community
(iii) Specific nuclear research problems
Page
S. 9/10 - 1969(c) Energy policy
(i) Summary comparison of the energy economies
(ii) The energy policy's general objectives and
framework of action
(ill) Establishing the common energy market
(d) Safeguards and controls
Chapter III  Agricultural policy
(a) Quantitative and qualitative changes in the basic
data concerning agriculture in an enlarged Community
(b) Special problems of candidate countries
(1) United Kingdom
(2) Ireland
(3) Denmark
(4) Norway
(c) Financial problems
Chapter IV  Other problems relating to economic union
(a) Liberalization of capital movements
(b) Harmonization of taxes
(c) Restrictive agreements and dominant positions
(d) Technical obstacles to trade: industrial standards
(e) Regional policy
(f) Financing of social security
(g) Nordic labour market
(h) Commonwealth Immigration Act
(i) Transport
(j) ECSC levy
S. 9/ 1 0 - 1969
PageB. ENLARGED COMMUNITY AND NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
Chapter 
1. General effects of enlargement on relations with
non-member countries
2. Relations with the developing countries
(a) General
(b) Effects of enlargement on relations with associated
countries
(c) Relations with the Maghreb countries
(d) Relations with the other developing countries
3. Relations with the other non-member countries
(a) Canada, Australia, New Zealand
(b) The United States
(c) Japan
(d) USSR and countries of Eastern Europe
Page
S. 9/10 - 1969INTRODUCTION
1. At a meeting held on 22/23 July 1969 the Council invited the
Commission to bring up to date the Opinions it had issued in
September 1967 and April 1968 concerning the applications for
membership from the United Kingdom, Ireland Denmark and
Norway.
2. In reviewing the above-mentioned documents, the Commission
has found that in general the points made in the Opinion of
September 1967 had lost nothing of their value and that there
was no need to modify the general trend of the document or the
conclusions drawn.
3. It is, however, indispensable that the document should be
brought up to date. The progress made tow:;lrds economic union
since 1967 has changed certain of the facts of the situation and
brought out the need to strengthen, to "deepen" or to develop the
Community. Attention had already been drawn to this need in the
Opinion of September 1967, and developments since that time have
aroused an awareness of the problems facing the six founder States
in conditions which are such that failure to recognize it would mean
jeopardizing the survival of what had been achieved in ten years
of joint endeavour. The prospect of a wider Community makes
such an examination more urgent than ever. Finally, the
institutional problems must be dealt with more fully than in the
Opinion of September 1967.
4. As in 1967, the present Opinion, also submitted under Articles 237
of the EEC Treaty, 205 of the Euratom Treaty and 98 of the ECSC
Treaty, is preliminary in character. The basic options will remain
open as long as the positions reached through negotiations are not
known.
1 On the other hand the Commission felt that the discussions in the Council on 22
and 23 July 1969 meant that the approach which underlay the Opinion of 2 April 1968 had
ceased to be relevant and that, while thedotument should remain in the dossier devoted to
enlargement of the Community, there was now no point in bringing it up to date.
$. 9/1 0 - 1969The Commission none the less considers that this document should
make it possible for the Council and the Member States to define
the framework of membership negotiations rapidly and with the
requisite precision.
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ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
Chapter 1
General
5. The United Kingdom, Ireland Denmark and Norway have
maintained their applications for membership. The candidature of
the United Kingdom cannot be considered in isolation from those
of the other three countries. On the one hand, an  a priori  choice
cannot be made between applications from European countries
which have all declared that they are ready to accept unreservedly
the Community s economic objectives and its aim of political union.
On the other hand, these other three countries could hardly
contemplate joining the Community independently of the United
Kingdom because of the links uniting them with that country,
particularly as members of EFTA, and it would also be difficult for
them to remain outside a Community enlarged by accession of the
United Kingdom alone.
6. The possibility for any European State to join the Community is
laid down in the Treaties of Paris and Rome. Furthermore, in the
Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, the founder States declared that
they were:
Determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union
among the European peoples
and
Resolved to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by
establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other
peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts
It is in this spirit, then, that the Community should examine
applications for membership made by any European countries which
subscribe to these principles and to these objectives.
$. 9/1 0 - 1969This being so, the Commission considers that accession by Sweden
should be envisaged only if the negotiations with that country were
to show that it is in a position to accept without restriction the
political aims of the Community as these appear from the
Preambles to the Treaties.
7. On the plane of principles, the accession of States whose
traditions of political equilibrium and democracy. are 
old-established and deep-seated as are those of the candidate
countries would be of great value to the Community, both as
regards its internal development and the exercise of increased
responsibilities in international life.
8. As regards objectives, the enlargement of the Common Market to
include countries whose level of development is comparable to that
of the Six would have the further effect of creating a large economic
entity which, particularly because of a better division of labour and
the greater economies of scale resulting from mass production
should permit a more rapid improvement in living standards.
However, these advantages need to be assessed in the light of the
Community s past experience. There are fairly narrow limits to
the elimination of obstacles to trade if it is not accompanied and
then underpinned by the establishment of a genuine economic
union enabling firms to adapt their organization and activities to
the new dimensions of the market. Unless complemented by such
positive action, the elimination of obstacles to trade will itself
remain precarIOus.
The fact that enlargement of the Community raises additional
problems makes it all the more important to maintain its dynamism.
9. In any case the accession of new members to the Communities
implies acceptance on their part not only of the Treaties but also
of the decisionsl which have been made since the Treaties came
into force.
1 The word" decisions" is used here in a general sense and does not refer to the character of ~he
acts taken by the ComIIiunity institutions. It also covers the agreements concluded wIth
non-member countries.
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compromise between the six founder States, have become essential
elements of the  de facto  solidarity which links the Six together and
from this angle, of the very existence of the Community. This
is why, as a general rule, a solution to the concrete problems will
have to be sought by working out transitional measures and not
by amending the existing rules.
In several fields measures have been envisaged or undertaken even
where the wording of the Treaties did no more than formulate
principles without providing for detailed commitments. This is the
case, for example, as regards the aid arrangements for coalmining,
medium-term policy, monetary policy, industrial policy, etc.
In each case the further commitments accepted by the Member
States resulted not just from the undertaking to establish an
economic union atnong themselves, but also from the practical
requirements brought out by experience gained in implementing
the Treaties; it has not, however, been found necessary to make
formal additions to the Treaties.
10. The acceptance by new members, during the membership
negotiations, of the objectives already fixed by the Community and
save for any minor adjustulents which might prove necessary, of the
acts already adopted, would not in itself suffice to ensure that the
tasks to be accomplished in the coming years will be successfully
completed. It remains to be seen, too, whether the commitments
written into the Treaty or already assumed by the present members
are sufficient to guarantee the efficacy of the enlarged Communities
or whether, on the contrary, certain more precise undertakings on
the part of the old and the new members will not be required.
I t therefore appears advisable to make sure, at least in certain
essential fields, that when negotiating with the present members of
the Community these countries should declare their agreement
with the necessary objectives and with the appropriate methods to
achieve them. These fields should include not only questions
whose interest and urgency would be increased by enlargement of the
S. 9/1 0 - 1969Communities, but also those to which the wider Community would
attribute fundamental importance from the angle of its future
economic and political development.
Chapter 2
The economic problems
11. The Commission devoted Titles II and III of its Opinion of
29 September 1967 to these questions, dealing in particular with the
economic aspects of enlargement. These it considered from the
internal point of view and from that of the Community s external
relations. Since some of the factors on which the Commission
analysis was based have since changed, the relevant passages have
been revised. The review has again made it clear that the main
problems, requiring priority consideration, concern essentially
agriculture and economic policy, especially monetary problems.
Since United Kingdom membership could be expected to lead 
membership for the other candidates and since the problems discussed
in this chapter are of overriding importance in connection with the
United Kingdom application, they have been examined primarily
from the point of view of the prospective membership of that
country.
(a) Agriculture
12. In its September 1967 Opinion, the Commission stated that
enlargement of the Community could not be allowed to call into
question the common agricultural policy.
An analysis of changes in the basic economic factors of agriculture
in an enlarged Communityl shows that membership of the four
candidate countries would not alter them. The entry of new
members would not by itself entail a review of the bases of the
1 An analysis of the changes in the basic factors and in the main problems posed by enlargement
- brought up to date according to the latest available data  is given in the Annex (Chapter III).
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on the common organization of that market with common prices
for the main products, a single system of trade with non~member
countries and priority for commodities produced in the Community.
The maintenance of these fundamental principles does not,
however mean that adaptation of the methods by which this
policy is implemented may. not prove necessary.
Nor should enlargement of the Community affect the principles
underlying the financing 
of  the agricultural policy, principles which
reflect the financial solidarity of the Six: Community financial
responsibility with regard to the 
price and marketing guarantees
provided by the market policy and the provision of funds with
which the Community can finance measures to improve the
structure  of  agriculture.
13. When restating its basic attitudes in the 
present Opinion, the
Commission is not unaware of the difficult problems, some of which
have grown more serious in recent years
, that will be raised 
extension  of  the Community policy 
to  countries where at present
the agricultural situation is unlike that 
in the Community and
the concept of agricultural policy also differs. Agreement on
some  of  these matters would have to be reached between old and
new members in the negotiations. The main problems are:
(i) The repercussions, on both production and consumption, that
will inevitably follow application of the common agricultural policy
in the enlarged Community;
(ii) The financial consequences of the common 
agricultural policy;
(iii) Difficulties which might arise in respect of Commonwealth
sugar and New Zealand butter.
It should be possible to solve the 
problems connected with levels 
farmgate and consumer prices by means of appropriate transitional
measures which would spread the 
necessary adjustments over a
period of time.
14. Since the Commission rendered its September 1967 Opinion,
the Community has become aware-independently of the question
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the agricultural market, both where farmers and the consumers .are
concerned and from the financial point of view. In its Memorandum
on the reform of agriculture submitted to the Council at the end of
1968, the Commission has suggested how the Community
agricultural problems could be solved. In particular, it has
recommended measures. to deal with the structure of production
and marketing and suggested a new approach to policy on markets
and prices. The new line envisaged for the common agricultural
policy is intended to establish equilibrium between output and
market potential, having due regard to possible imports and
exports, and to ensure that there is now and in the future a
satisfactory remuneration for the capital and labour employed
in agriculture.
15. If, before the opening of negotiations, the Community were to
agree on the aims of such a new approach in agricultural policy, the
road would be open for solving the economic and social problems
which have beset agriculture for so long that prompt action is
called for. The need for such action is made even more urgent by
the prospect that the Community may be enlarged.
Just to extend the existing common agricultural policy (especially
the price and marketing guarantees) to the new members without
the revision recommended could well engender a major increase in
the output of certain key agricultural products in the candidate
countries. On the other hand, the drive to improve the structure of
production in agriculture and of the relevant marketing system will
help the agricultural sector to close the gap between the situation
in the Community and the highly efficient agriculture of certain
candidate countries.
16. By establishing the targets to be achieved in the process of
revising the agricultural policy, the Community would create a
favourable outlook which could induce the new members to accept
more easily certain commitments that they will have to assume.
This is particularly the case where the financing problem and the
problem of trade with non-member countries are concerned.
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budgeted for in 1969 on present bases for the support of the market
in the Six alone, and given that this sum is likely to increase, the new
members may well have doubts about accepting the principles which
underlie the financing of the common agricultural policy and would
be tempted to challenge them. By an act of political will and a
vigorous drive to establish a new approach .to this policy, the
necessary sums, especially for market support, can be scaled down
to a much lower figure. These measures would entail a maj or
financial effort for a limited period, but the resulting longer-term
outlook would strengthen the Community s case for requiring the
candidate countries to accept the common agricultural policy,
including the principle of financial solidarity and its consequences
as soon as they join.
18. With regard to the problem of the costs arISIng from the
application of the agricultural policy, it should be noted that
the Community agricultural system combined with the own resources
system will result in these costs being borne by the consumer. For
foodstuffs produced in the Community, the consumer will, generally
speaking, pay a price that stems from the market organization
measures. For imported foodstuffs he will pay the same price
which in this case will include the levy and any customs duties.
These levies and duties will be credited to the Community budget
as will the customs duties on industrial goods and any indirect taxes
which are also paid by the consumer. Expenditure from the
Community budget, including that for agriculture, will therefore be
entirely defrayed by the consumer.
This system will be necessary because of the supply situation in the
Community and of the place occupied by the agricultural sector in
the economy as a whole, a situation which will not be changed
fundamentally by enlargement.
The extension to the candidate countries of the common agricultural
policy with a common price level and an own resources system will
mean that the consumer in the candidate countries, as now in the
Member States, will defray, without discrimination, the costs of the
common policy.
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agriculture more competitive, to get rid of structural surpluses in the
Community while avoiding increases in agricultural production 
the candidate countries, it should be possible to maintain in the
enlarged Community a certain volume of imports and thus to
reconcile the interests of agriculture and the interests of the external
trade of this Community. With this in view, account could also be
taken, when the common agricultural policy of the enlarged
Community is put into practice, of the adjustments certain
Commonwealth countries would have to make. In view of the
preponderant position which the enlarged Community will occupy
where international trade in agricultural produce is concerned, and
of the worldwide responsibilities which will consequently rest on the
Community, it would seem that the measures it takes in this
context should be coupled with much wider action at world level.
The Community should take the necessary initiative to ensure
that all the major countries exporting or importing agricultural
products act in concert with the Community.
20. Briefly, the Commission believes that the negotiations must not
jeopardize the essentials of the common agricultural policy; the
problems raised for the new members by the need to adapt
themselves to this policy must be solved through appropriate
transitional measures.
(b) Economic and financial problems
21. In its Opinion of 29 September 1967, the Commission stated that
among the candidate countries the United Kingdom required, from
the economic and financial point of view, special study. 
emphasized three problems "that would have to be resolved
before that country could, where economic policy and the balance
of payments are concerned, effectively pursue the objectives laid
down by the Treaty of Rome . These were:
(i) The deficit in the United Kingdom balance of payments, which
must be eliminated op. a lasting basis if the United Kingdom is to be
able to shoulder the obligat:lons now borne by member countries
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for the United Kingdom because of its membership;
(ii) The fluctuations in the sterling balances, which can expose
sterling to sudden strains, constitute a factor of disequilibrium in the
United Kingdom economy and would be a source of difficulty for the
Community if and when Britain joins;
(iii) The international role of sterling, in view of the difficulties
which the role of sterling could cause with regard to the convergence
of economic objectives between the United Kingdom and the other
members of an enlarged Community, and also in connection with the
future establishment of a Community monetary system.
Since that Opinion was submitted to the Council, events have
occurred in the British economy which affect the problems referred
to above. The most important of these events are:
(i) The 14. 10 devaluation of sterling in November 1967 and its
consequences for the United Kingdom balance of payments;
(ii) The implementation of a system set up within the framework of
the Bank for International Settlements to curb withdrawals on
sterling balances held by public authorities of the sterling area
countries.
22. The Commission made certain oral comments on the devaluation
of sterling at a Council session on 11 December 1967.
The effects expected from the change in the parity of sterling and
from the economic policy measures announced by the British
Government in a letter of intent sent to the International Monetary
Fund in November 1967, when Britain was seeking an additional
credit of $1 400 million from the IMF to support these measures,
have been materialized but with some delay.
Because of the difficulties experienced by the British Government in
reaching the targets it had set itself and the problems raised by the
repayment of certain debts on the dates originally agreed, it decided
in the early months of 1969 to re-examine the policy pursued after
devaluation and to amend its balance of payments aims.
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22 May 1969 set out new economic policy commitments based on
attainment during the budget year ending on 31 March 1970 of a
surplus of at least !300 million on the basic balance of payments.
23. It is not impossible that this objective will be achieved in the
period stated. Exports are developing satisfactorily, and in the
future they will be stimulated by the vigorous reorganization of
British industry that has been promoted over the last two years by
the IRC (Industrial Reorganization Corporation). "Invisible
earnings" have climbed sharply, but no firm predictions can be
made in this connection. In the first half of 1969, the United
Kingdom balance of payments achieved an overall surplus of
!100 million. It is however difficult at the present time to make
any definite statement concerning the nature and the exact scale
of the improvements in the balance of payments. Interpretation
of the figures raises delicate technical problems. Moreover, the
improvement took place during a period of rapid expansion of
world trade and at a time when certain temporary restrictions on
imports into the United Kingdom were in force (system of
compulsory import deposits). Finally, it should be noted that in
the first half of 1969, the period during which the improvement
in the figures was particularly clear growth was weak, since in
annual terms it is still below 1.5%.
However, if the impression that the British economy has entered a
phase of export-led growth were to be confirmed, the balance of
payments objective pursued could well be achieved without growth
lagging behind a rate consonant with the full employment of the
country s productive resources.
24. A lasting recovery in the United Kingdom balance of payments
is all the more desirable since regular servicing of its debts, other
than those denominated in sterling, will require substantial payments
surpluses over a fairly long period. During 1969, the servicing of
long- and mediuIll-term debts, mainly because of certain large sums
becoming due to the IMF, has entailed considerable difficulties.
According to official information published early in the year, the
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debts to central banks) was more than!3 000 million, and payments
of some !630 million (including interest) should have been made
during the present year; some of the deadlines were readjusted after
negotiation. The amounts to be paid in 1970 and 1971 should
on an annual average, be about !300 million (including interest).
The figures concerning total short-term official indebtedness to
monetary authorities who took part in the support of sterling are
not available; they are in any case liable to fluctuations, which can
sometimes be abrupt.
This analysis shows that the constraints which will in the next few
years be imposed on the British economy by the need to achieve a
lasting recovery in the balance of payments and to repay the debts
contracted since 1965 should not be ignored when, during any
negotiations, the nature and details of a transitional period are
being established.
25. With regard to the sterling balances, the Commission considered
that the previous arrangements for dealing with this hazard were
insufficient. The question today is whether the new agreements
concluded in September 1968 are sufficient to dispel the concern
that can be felt in this connection.
The arrangements made are twofold. In the first place, the United
Kingdom gives the sterling area countries a dollar-value guarantee
on that proportion of their official sterling holdings exceeding 10%
of their reserves. In return, these countries undertake to maintain
a minimum proportion of their reserves in sterling. Most of the
agreements, concluded bilaterally between the United Kingdom
and each of the sterling area countries, are for a period of three
years; they will be reviewed six months before expiry.
Secondly, the Bank for International Settlements, in agreement
with 12 central banks, has accorded to the United Kingdom a
credit facility of f2 000 million, i.e. less than a third of the United
Kingdom current sterling commitments to the sterling area
countries. This amount is designed to offset the immediate effect on
the United Kingdom s reserves of any reduction below the agreed
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and private, persons in the overseas countries of the area.
Drawings may be made until September 1971; repayments must
take place between the sixth and the tenth year after the signing
of the agreement.
26. If it is borne in mind that the main object of the arrangements
in question was to eliminate a tendency for countries with sterling
balances to diversify their reserves and so to provide a temporary
solution to an urgent problem, there is no doubt that they have 
far, been crowned with success: not only have withdrawals ceased
but the balances held by public authorities in the sterling area
countries have grown, rising from !1 506 million at the end of
September 1968 to !1847 million at the end of March 1969 and
!1 906 mHlion at the end of June. It is much more difficult to say
how far these agreements contribute to the solution of the problem
raised in the Commission s Opinion. At present, when one considers
the effect produced by the Basle Agreements on the current figure
of sterling balances, it would seem that these agreements have helped
to consolidate the role of sterling as a reserve currency. If this
tendency were to continue, the short-term result would undoubtedly
be to make it easier for the United Kingdom to finance its balance
of payments. In the longer term, the fate of an increased amount
in sterling balances would depend, failing an indefinite renewal of
the agreements, on the confidence of creditors in sterling, i.e. in
the last analysis on the strength of the United Kingdom balance of
paYments.
27. The central banks of the Community countries made an
important but only partial contribution to the Basle Agreement of
September 1968: a lasting and effective solution to the problem
of the sterling balances goes beyond the financial potential of the
Community countries alone. Moreover, this problem, which in
essence is international since the sterling reserves constitute a
part of world liquidity, could be dealt with correctly only within
the framework of the international monetary institutions. However
this problem-and whatever solution may be found-is sufficiently
important for the functioning of an enlarged Community that 
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United Kingdom; the discussions would establish certain guidelines
in this field and the conditions on which the Community would
participate in any international action that might be taken.
28. Although the devaluation of sterling has opened the road to the
solution of certain problems posed in the Opinion of 29 September
1967 and may help towards the adaptation which membership to
the Community would impose on the United Kingdom, the pattern
of developments in the foreign currency liabilities of the Unite~
Kingdom and in the sterling balances is less clear. The prospects
in this field should therefore be discussed with the United Kingdom
Government.
There have at times been attempts from various quarters to propose
rapid solutions to problems which are of extreme complexity. 
is not for instance sufficient to look at the United Kingdom
external liabilities and make that country s liabilities seem less
formidable by setting against them a list of its private and public
assets abroad, for between the liabilities and the assets in question
there are the considerable differences of nature and liquidity.
Again, it seems overbold to imagine that even the temporary use of
various technical procedures in the administration of exchange
rates would be likely to eliminate these difficulties, the solution of
which depends mainly on the compliance of each country with the
rules which ensure the achievement of fundamental equilibria and,
within the Community, on a more effective co-ordination of economic
policies.
29. In this respect, the idea expressed in the Opinion of
29 September 1967 that "it would not be enough if the countries
applying for membership merely stated their agreement with
general objectives: they should also accept the priorities that
advancing Community co-ordination has made it possible to
establish both internally and at international level" remains
fundamental for the Commission.
I t assumes particular importance in view of the results obtained by
the Community in the international monetary negotiations which
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Monetary Fund and to the creation of the special drawing rights
system.
Its importance is further enhanced by the Council's decisions, taken
on 17 July 1969, that the medium-term economic policies of the
Member States should be more fully concerted, the co-ordination of
current economic policies made more effective and monetary
co-operation in the Community implemented by appropriate means.
This will enable unduly serious disequilibria between Community
countries to be prevented and the conditions governing the
maintenance of stable intra~Community exchange rates to be more
adequately fulfilled-stable exchange rates are required not only
because without them common agricultural prices are impossible
but even more because without them transactions within the
Common Market cannot be made with confidence and will not
expand.
In setting out on this path, the Member States of the present
Community are .approaching a new phase in the construction of the
Community, a stage which must eventually lead to the establishment
of a Community monetary system. The cohesion and the
dynamism of an enlarged Community will depend largely on the
acceptance by the candidate countries of the objectives and
methods underlying this new venture.
Chapter 3
The practical problems
(a) Problems raised by simultaneity of the applications
30. It will be necessary to know whether, in view of the problems
raised by the fact that four States are at present candidates for
membership, it is better to stagger the negotiations, with the
intention that all four States should join the Community at the
same time, or to stagger the dates of joining, starting with the United
Kingdom, on whose membership that of the other applicants depends.
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important both for the applicant countries and for the Community-
and from the difficulty there would be in working out different
transitional arrangements for each of the new members, spreading
the accessions over a period of time would entail institutional
problems that would outweigh any benefits. The prospect of
further countries joining could not be left out of account during
negotiations with the first country. It would therefore be necessary
to begin by working out provisional arrangements for certain States
subsequently making definitive arrangements to take effect once the
last member was in, and to ensure that the definitive arrangements
would also suit the members whose entry had been held up.
31. Because of these drawbacks it is hardly possible to envisage
staggering the dates for membership: it would surely be better to
have some staggering of the negotiations. This latter method
should not exclude the requisite co-ordination on questions that
cannot be settled in isolation at each set of negotiations. In any
case, the institutional adjustments cannot be negotiated until
agreement has been reached with the four applicants on all the
other problems. The four treaties of accession (plus perhaps a
fifth with Sweden) would then come into force simultaneously.
32. If, however, the negotiations or ratification procedures were
to be delayed appreciably in respect of one or more applicant
countries, or if any country were to find, during or at the end of the
negotiations, that it could not maintain its application for
membership, alternative arrangements would have to be made to
enable the other applicants to join the Community.
(b) Problems involved in actual entry
33. In view of the imminent completion of the7transitional period
and the problems of adjustment this will involve, there can 
longer be any question of the new members having to "catch up
with the Six immediately and in all fields. It would seem logical
that there should be transitional arrangements extending over a
number of years.
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(i) The purpose of the transitional arrangements would be to spread
over a period the economic consequences resulting from the
application of the Community rilles by the new members. In
areas where transitional measures proved inevitable, they should noj:
prevent the new members from adopting as rapidly as possible the
legal framework and the instruments established by the Community
rules. The transitional adjustments ought then to disappear
according to a prearranged timetable.
The legal framework and implementing mechanisms would
presumably have to be adopted immediately in the case of the
agricultural market organizations and the rules governing the
customs union.
(ii) Another question is whether it is possible and desirable to have
different transitional periods for industry and agriculture. The
Community has always endeavoured to keep liberalization of
industrial goods and establishment of the agricultural common
market more or less in step. This principle should be maintained
when new members are admitted.
(iii) Lastly, if the date of entry into force of the treaties and the
timing of the transitional measures-especially as regards
movement of goods-were to vary for different products or were to
be adapted to the specific problems of each State acceding, the
Community woilld come up against very serious difficulties
(deflection of trade, administrative complications, particularly as
regards the control of origin, risks of error or of disputes, and 
on). It would therefore be advisable for the timetable to be the
same for all concerned and for waivers or exceptions to be kept
to a minimum.
Chapter 4
Economic integration in Europe
34. Alongside the applications for full membership, and in most
cases because of these applications, a number of European countries
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open negotiations with the Community for the purpose of
establishing special relations. Consequently, the prospects of
enlargement bring the Community face to face with the problem
of the economic organization of a large part of Europe.
35. The gradual establishment of the common market has already
exerted considerable attraction on the countries neighbouring the
Community: association agreements have been concluded with
Greece and Turkey, and negotiations with a view to preferential
agreements have been opened with Austria and Spain and are
envisaged with Malta.
The prospect of the Community being enlarged induced Switzerland
in 1961 to ask that negotiations be opened. The Swiss Government
has made it known to the Community on a number of occasions, the
last quite recently, that it considers its 1961 application to be still
pending.
Similarly, in 1962, the Governments of Portugal and Cyprus
requested negotiations, and in various ways they have made it
clear that these applications still stand.
The Finnish Government, without making a direct approach to the
Community, has on several occasions made statements advocating
Finland' s participation, in some form consistent with its neutrality,
in the economic integration of Europe.
And finally it appears that, if the negotiations with Sweden did not
lead to membership, it would still be the chief objective of the
Swedish Government to establish special relations with an enlarged
Comm unity.
36. The countries of southern Europe, which are at a stage of
economic development that rules out any idea of immediate
membership of the Community, should be able. to establish
with an enlarged Community preferential relations so conceived that
their development would benefit. Such relations could not take the
form of association proper except in the case of those countries
whose institutions and regimes are comparable with those of the
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would enable the Community to take account of their subsequent
evolutions.
On the other hand, for countries which are sufficiently developed
economically and possess institutions and regimes comparable with
those of the founder States, the Community has always considered
that full membership was the arrangement that accorded best
with the objectives of the Treaties. The drawbacks of association
agreements or preferential agreements with such countries are well
known: first, these countries might in certain cases have to comply
with decisions in the taking of which they had had no part, and
second, the commitments on consultation and the multiplicity of
special arrangements would make for inextricable complications for
the Community. The Commission therefore considers that the
Community should not normally contemplate agreements of this
kind except with such countries as could not become full members
because of their international circumstances; and even this it
should do only after taking every possible precaution to ensure that
its decisions would continue to be made in full independence and
that its operation was not unduly complicated.
37. Once the essential arrangements for the accession of new
members have been defined, the Community could examine with
the. other European countries involved the problems that arise-
particularly those due to the fact that most of these countries
and the candidates for membership all belong to the large
preferential trading area of EFT 
The Commission considers, however, that this problem can be
examined profitably only at a later stage in the process of enlarging
the Community. It also reserves the right to inform the Council at
that time of the action it thinks should be taken.
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STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY
Chapter 1
The Community s future development
38. The Community is about to reach the end of the transitional
period. Some important decisions still have to be taken, but it may
be expected that the timetables laid down in the Treaties will, as a
whole, be complied with.
But it is important to avoid the Community s achievements being
threatened by the pull of divergent forces; it is therefore both
necessary and urgent for the Community to be strengthened. The
members of the Council have expressed themselves to this effect on
a number of occasions, in particular at their meeting of 22 July 1969.
The Commission has repeatedly insisted on the need for such
strengthening, particularly in its statement of 1 July 1968 and in the
Introduction to the Second General Report on the Activities of the
Communities.
39.. The Commission furthermore stresses, as it did in its Opinion
of 29 September 1967, that the cohesion and the dynamism which
are indispensable for the Community depend in part on the
convergence of the national policies . of the Member States, in
particular, but not exclusively, of their foreign and defence policies.
The Commission is well aware that the Member States have as yet
done nothing to put into practice the intentions they have expressed
on this subject. The action to be taken in this field can only be
worked out gradually, and it will always have to be kept in mind
that, as the Community develops, such action will necessarily play
an increasingly determinant role in its existence, its orientation and
its cohesion.
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and precise rules for applYing those provisions in the Treaties which
require the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement in the
Community. Once these rules were adopted, their implementation
was more often than not a matter for day-to-day administration
and required few political decisions.
The gradual transition from the customs union to the economic
union will on the other hand require not only the return to normal
functioning of the Community institutions but even their
strengthening. It is also important that the Community should
have the appropriate tools to ensure the success of whatever action
is needed for the transition to be carried out smoothly.
With this in view the Commission has already sent to the Council the
following proposals:
(i) Commission memorandum on the pursuit of the studies on
Technological Co-operation (Doc. SEC(6.8)1524 of 15 May 1968);
(ii) Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European
Economic Community (Doc. COM(68)1000 of 18 December 1968);
(iii) Commission memorandum to the Council on the "First
Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy" (Doc. COM(68) 1040 of
17 January 1969);
(iv) Commission memorandum to the Council on the Co-ordination
of Economic Policies and Monetary Co-operation within the
Community (Doc. COM(69)t50 of 12 February 1969);
(v) Proposal for a decision on the gradual standardization of
agreements concerning Member States commercial relations
with non-member countries and the negotiation of Community
agreements (Doc. COM(69)126 of 25 February 1969);
(vi) Commission memorandum to the Council concerning Euratom
future activities (Doc. COM(69)350 of 23 April 1969);
(vii) Commission Opinion on the reform of the European Social
Fund by virtue of Article 126 of the EEC Treaty (Doc. COM(69)347
of 4 May 1969);
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financial contributions of the Member States by the Communities
own resources and on greater budgetary powers for the European
Parliament (Doc. COM(69)700 of 16 July 1969).
41. In the longer term, some time will be necessary to narrow, as
a preliminary step, the divergences between the economic policies of
the Member States and, subsequently, to define and implement
Community policies. However, this twofold action is not equally
urgent in all sectors; on the contrary, it can be staggered in the light
of the priorities attaching to the various fields. For instance, the
common bases for an economic and monetary policy which would
ensure smooth transition from the customs union to the economic
union should be laid down as rapidly as possible.
Chapter 2
Strengthening and enlargement
. 42. To strengthen the Community in this way means not only
consolidating what it has already achieved and ensuring its further
development, but also making suitable arrangements for receiving
the candidate countries. I t is in this setting of the measures to be
taken and of the time needed for their execution that the problem of
enlarging the Community is to be seen.
It is advisable to deal  pari passu  with the decisions on strengthening
and the replies to be given to the applications for membership. But
we must also make sure that the decisions concerning enlargement
do not delay the important decisions on the action required to
strengthen the Community.
43. In view of the link between strengthening and enlargement
the candidate countries will have to express, at the opening of the
negotiations, their agreement not only with the principle of accepting
the progress which the Community has already made-that is to
say the Treaties plus the decisions taken since they came into
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on or now being through with the principle  of  strengthening the
Community.
The aim  of  these measures is to solve the problems which confront
both the founder States and the candidates, who must all ensure the
balanced and satisfactory growth  of  their economies, improve the
efficacy  of  their production apparatus and, in a more general way,
take up the many and varied challenges stemming frorp. the constant
changes that are inevitable in modem industrial societies. The
agreements  of  principle demanded  of  the candidate countries should
therefore not constitute an obstacle to the negotiations.
It is nevertheless important to be able to make sure during the
negotiations that, if they should be successful, the said agreements
of  principle will be actually embodied in the reality  of  an enlarged
Community.
In this respect it would be helpful if the candidate countries pursued
policies convergent with those implemented in the Community. 
this way they would be able to establish their economies on more
solid foundations, while at the same time achieving some part  of  the
adaptation necessary for full participation in the activities  of 
enlarged Community.
This action by the candidate States would facilitate the early
solution  of  the many and varied problems raised when they accept
what the Community has already achieved; it would also make it
possible, if the negotiations prove successful, to keep the duration
and the scope  of  the transitional measures down to a minimum.
The convergent policies thus pursued simultaneously by the founder
States and the candidate States during the earlier part  of  the
negotiations would help at a later stage to strengthen an enlarged
Community and in any case to avoid the mechanical effects 
enlargement weakening or watering down the present Community.
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FUNCTiONING OF THE INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 
General
44. The concern expressed on many occasions by the Commission
and in the Council about the conditions required for the smooth
working of the Communities cannot but be increased by the prospect
of negotiations on an exceptionally large scale and of the foreseeable
consequences of the accessions that might result.
Any increase in the number of Member States is likely to make
institutional mechanisms more cumbersome. The adjustments
needed-these are in fact provided for in Article 237 of the EEC
Treaty-should therefore be made in such a way as to maintain
the efficacy of the system and to offset the mechanical effects
of enlargement.
The need to ensure the efficacy and to maintain the role of the
institutional machinery in an enlarged Community becomes clearer
still when one considers that the transition to a real economic union
involves a substantial number of decisions that will have to be
spread over a period of time. To the extent, however, that these
decisions can be fitted into rigid and exact timetables, due account
should be taken of the constantly evolving and often unpredictable
character of the underlying realities and of the speed with which
action has to be taken in such matters.
450 The problem of improving and strengthening the institutional
machinery must be tackled in any case. The Community has
become a large entity that has to be governed and administered in
the same way as the territory of any country. The Commission has
already drawn attention to this problem, particularly in its
statement of 1 July 1968 and in the Introduction to the Second
S. 9/10 - 1969General Report on the Activities of the Communities. The
prospect of enlargement only makes these tasks of improvement
and strengthening more immediate and more urgent than ever.
Chapter 2
Improvements to the functioning of the institutions
in the Conununity as it is today
46. Agreement ought therefore to be reached as soon as possible
within the Community, and at latest by the end of the negotiations
that the functioning of all the Community institutions should be
reviewed.
(a) The Parliament
47. As the Community develops, as its common policies are worked
out and put into effect, as the influence exerted by the Community
over national policies becomes clearer, a better institutional balance
must be established, in which the Parliament and its powers of
supervision would playa bigger part than was originally assigned to
them. Consequently, the following two steps will have to be taken
without delay.
The first is to give the Parliament real budgetary powers. Article
201 of the Treaty lays down that once the common customs tariff
has been definitively introduced the Community is to have its own
sources of revenue without the money passing through the budgets
of the Member States. This will in itself necessitate an extension of
the Parliament's supervisory powers-a point that has recently
. been made on many occasions by the Council and the Commission.
The Commission is at present submitting precise proposals on this
point to the Council. It is to be hoped that rapid agreement will
prove possible, since any decisions taken will have to be ratified 
the national parliaments.
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suffrage-another development explicitly required by the Treaties.
The matter is by now one of topical interest, and here again it may
be hoped that a general agreement is not too far away.
Successful action on these matters would be in itself a considerable
step forward and would substantially strengthen the institutional
structure of the Community.
(b) The Council
48. The efficacy of the Council's decision-making methods has
become a major problem in the institutional life of the Community.
It is impaired first and foremost by application of the unanimity rule
in cases where the Treaties do not require it. This explains why
many questions have remained unsettled for months and even years.
The progress of integration has thus been appreciably slowed down
and sometimes completely blocked. The delays affecting the
Community s relations with the rest of the world, particularly in its
commercial policy, and the high cost of certain aspects
of the agricultural policy are, to a large extent, a result of these
institutional aberrations. And these drawbacks are likely to be
even more numerous in an enlarged Community.
Another difficulty is that a number of member countries have
refused and still refuse, because of differences of opinion with the
other members, to join in the search for compromise solutions
acceptable to all. This practice of imposing a "veto" would have
even more serious consequences in an enlarged Community.
To meet these difficulties, two principles should be accepted and
acted upon without delay:
(i) Decisions by majority vote should again become the normal
practice of the Council in all fields where the Treaties do not
explicitly require the contrary.
(ii) There are also fields in which the unanimous agreement of Council
members is required. Among them are those areas where the
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for putting them into effect are only sketchily defined or would
mean the issue by the Community of a whole set of laws and
regulations. In these cases unanimity should be required only
on the outline decisions~those laying down the targets in each
specific field and perhaps the broad lines of procedure to be followed
~with majority voting for the implementing decisions that remain.
(c) The Commission
49. The counterpart of majority voting in the Council is the
Commission s independence and its right to initiate legislation.
Under the institutional arrangements laid down in the Treaties, the
legitimate interests of the minority are protected by the fact that
unanimity is required before a Commission proposal can be altered.
The right of initiative, independence and authority of the
Commission, then, are of absolutely basic importance for the
efficient functioning of the Community. This is all the more true
now that the Community has completed the first period of build-up
and is now moving on to a period concerned with the management
of current business.
Consequently, further pow~rs of management should gradually be
transferred to the Commission as agreement is reached on the new
objectives to be attained and as the Community is strengthened.
The balance between the institutions of the Community, which gives
the Commission responsibility for the day-t?-day running of affairs
in close liaison with the Council and the Member States, should be
fully maintained and developed. The agricultural management
committees could serve as an example in many other fields.
The Commission wishes to stress its conviction that it is only by
returning to respect for both the letter and the spirit of the
institutional arrangements laid down in the Treaty, by ensuring
that they operate efficiently and by strengthening them in the light
of developments and the requirements of Community life, that the
Community will be able to accept in security the risks involved
in enlargement.
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The institutions of an enlarged Community
50. If the institutional machinery of the present Community is
strengthened and supplemented along these lines, the problems
raised in this field by the enlargement of the Community will be less
important and less intractable.
The Treaties properly use the word "adjustments" to denote the
limited nature of the changes that will prove necessary.
The Commission has already dealt with this point in its September
1967 Opinion and has only a few comments to add.
. (i) The Parliament
51. The enlargement of the Community would lead to an increase
in the membership of the European Parliament.
On this occasion there should be a review of the distribution of seats
among the representatives of the peoples of the Community
countries.
(ii) The Council
52. A number of difficult problems arise from the enlargement of
the Community.
First, it will scarcely be possible to contemplate eliminating the
decisions requiring unanimity and replacing them in every case by
majority decisions. Where unanimity was still required, the risk
of inaction could be diminished if it were possible during the
membership negotiations to work out a fairly broad consensus on
the further action, whether provided for in the Treaties or not, that
urgently needed to be undertaken; enlargement could thus be
effected in the best possible conditions from the outset and the
de facto  solidarity required if the enlarged Community is to work
properly could be established among its members as quickly as
possible.
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level of the qualified majority. As regards this last point, existing
arrangements would have to be adjusted in an enlarged Community
in such a way that its ability to act was preserved.
This would be all the more necessary because an increase in the
number of Member States could mean that national interests and
considerations of immediate political expediency might be even
more divergent than before.
In any case, the level of the qualified majority should be determined
in such a way as not to detract from the power of this provision to
deter any State tempted to prolong a discussion indefinitely.
Minority interests should be guaranteed by making it a general rule
that no majority decision can be taken except on a proposal from the
Commission.
(iii) The Commission
53. Deciding on the number of members of the Commission as a
consequence of enlarging the Community, apart from the questions
arising simply from concern that Community mechanisms should be
effective, will raise a problem of balance that should be dealt with
during the negotiations. The Commission must be in a position
to play its role fully. Its collegiate character and the desire for
impartiality require that its membership should be kept to the
mInImum.
The Commission does not believe that it would be politically feasible
at the Communities' present stage of  development to envisage an
arrangement under which the Commission would not include
nationals of all Member States.
It also considers that to increase the number of Commissioners,
though it would add to the total of personal ability, would be bound
to make the functioning of the Commission more cumbersome.
The size of the Commission should therefore be decided with an eye
to both its collegiate character and the demands of efficiency.
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54. The accession of new members presents hardly any difficulties
as regards this institution.
When, however, the number of judges is increased, care should be
taken that the total is still an odd number, as required by the
Protocol on the Statute of the Court.
(v) The Economic and Social Committee, Euratom Scientific and
Technical Committee and the ECSC Consultative Committee
55. In the case of these Committees enlargement would entail a
corresponding increase in the number of members. Everything
should be done to ensure that Committee members represent as
fully as possible the interests in whose name they have been
appointed.
56. It would be well if the attention of the applicant countries were
drawn to the development that the Community institutional
machinery is likely to undergo in the future.
This is first of all because the powers of the institutions are allocated
and defined differently in each of the three Treaties of Paris and
Rome and because it is difficult at the present stage to foresee what
the institutions will be as a result of the Treaty merging the existing
Communities.
A further reason is that the role of the European Parliament can
logically be expected to expand. In its July 1969 proposals on the
creation of the Community s "own resources" and on the budgetary
powers of the Parliament, the Commission expressed the view that
from 1974 onwards the European Parliament should be endowed
with legislative powers.
The current Treaties, essential as they are, are only one step towards
the construction of an increasingly united and institutionalized
Europe. The applicant countries must be fully aware of the fact
that they are not only joining an economic and social undertaking,
but that they will be required to participate fully in creating a
continent which is economically and politically united.
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REMARKS ON PROCEDURE
The Commission believes that the time has come to draw the
Council' s attention to the following comments on the procedure
for the negotiations.
Prior examination by the Six
57. The Council will recall that its examination of the Commission
Opinion begun in October 1967 was interrupted at a relatively early
stage because of the political divergences of opinion then existing
between the Member States and that it was never completed.
The Commission feels that it would be desirable if, prior to the
opening of negotiations proper by the Community, the Council were
to resume its examination of the Commission Opinion of
29 September 1967 in conjunction with that of 1 October 1969
and to determine the main lines of the position to be defended
by the Community when negotiations begin.
Content of the negotiations
58. An effort will have to be made, both in the preliminary
examination described above and in the negotiations proper, to
concentrate on the important issues involving political economic
or social choices. Negotiations must not get bogged down 
detailed discussions on all the minor problems.
In this respect the negotiations of 1961-63 seem to have gone into
too much detail in certain areas. The debates on kangaroo meat
are still quoted as the supreme example of this excessive
perfectionism. It would be well to concentrate on essentials
during the negotiations, leaving to the institutions of the enlarged
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resolved during the negotiations.
The Commission is prepared, once the Council considers the time
ripe for such a step, to submit a list of the essential points on which
in its view, agreement should be reached during the negotiations
themselves.
Negotiating procedure
59. The Council will recall that, on the previous occasion, the
entire negotiations were entrusted to an intergovernmental
conference which met in Brussels at ministerial level and, between
meetings at deputies' level. This extremely long and cumbersome
procedure did not lead to success.
The Commission does not consider that Article 237 of the Treaty of
Rome necessarily requires a technique of this kind. Without
wishing to get involved in legal controversy, it doubts if this
Article entrusts the Member States meeting in the Council with the
task of negotiating individually with non-member countries on
Community policies already formulated and in operation, such as
customs tariff policy or the common commercial policy, over
which they no longer have individual control.
But it is also convinced that this negotiating technique is not a very
happy one. By the very fact of negotiating individually with
non-member countries, the Member States accentuate rather than
play down the differences between their points of view. The non-
member countries themselves are tempted to divide the Member
States and to conduct talks with them in parallel, and this damages
the cohesion of the Community, hardens positions and finally, as
was seen in 1962, creates a situation conducive to failure rather than
success.
The Commission therefore feels that the Community would be well
advised to draw on the experience it has gained in the various
important negotiations it has conducted and on this occasion to
divide the negotiations into two phases.
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Round. The Commission would be given a mandate to negotiate
on behalf of the Community; it would keep the Council constantly
informed and would follow the directives given it by the Council.
It will be remembered that this method worked well for four years
during the Kennedy Round (;tnd led to the success of the negotiations
to the satisfaction of the Council and of the Member States. This
phase of the negotiations would embrace the problems posed by
common policies already in operation or in course of elaboration
(common external tariff common agricultural policy and so on),
for which Community-type negotiations seem particularly
appropriate.
There would then be a second phase conducted by the Member
States meeting within the Council. Once they had decided on the
acceptability of the results achieved during the first phase, the
Member States would devote themselves first and foremost to the
more peculiarly political issues, such as the general political
problems resulting from the enlargement of the Community,
institutional problems, and the adjustments to be made to the
texts of the Treaties.
The Commission is convinced that a procedure of this kind, which
has proved its worth in the past, would allow of more coherent, more
dynamic and also more rapid negotiations and that it would offer a
greater chance of success. When the time comes, it would be well
to discuss this procedure with the non~member countries concerned.
S. 9/1 0 - 1969CONCLUSIONS
60. At the close of this analysis of the main problems arising in the
context of enlargement, the Commission finds that the general lines
and conclusions of its 1967 Opinion are still valid.
Because, however, of the changes which have occurred in the
meantime, it has examined the problems of strengthening the
Community in the context of its enlargement in greater detail than
it did in 1967. I t has come to the conclusion that, because of the
close links between these two issues, they must be considered
simultaneously rather than treated separately.
61. As regards strengthening, the Community cannot stop where it
. now is. One of two things can happen; either, under the pressure of
the divergent forces already in evidence, the Community will
paradoxically, allow its unity to be impaired just when the customs
union has been completed at great cost in terms of effort and the
pace of technological progress is steadily adding to the advantages
offered by a large single market; or, by using the Community
institutions to assure convergence of the policies followed by
Member States, it will consolidate and widen the results obtained
to the benefit of all.
It is therefore essential to make the necessary progress in the
sectors (agricultural, economic and monetary, social, institutional
et~.) which have been stressed as being important in the present
document. The Commission has already made various proposals in
this direction. Action has already begun within the Community.
It must be pursued and reinforced.
62. The enlargement of the Community to include new members
must not be a brake on this action. Only a strong Community can
provide a suitable framework for receiving the applicant States.
The applicants can consider their request for membership only
against a background such as this. At the beginning of the
negotiations, they will have to state their agreement not only
with the principle of accepting what has been attained by the
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since thes~ came into force-but also, in full knowledge of the
measures agreed on or in course of implementation within the
Community, with the principle of strengthening the Community.
Finally, they will need to adopt policies that are convergent with
those pursued in the Community thus ensuring its reinforcement.
63. The Commission considers that the framework described and
the principles to which attention has been drawn in its 1967 and
1969 Opinions could well facilitate a joint examination, with the
candidates for membership, of the problems posed by enlargement
of the Community and could contribute to the search for solutions
which would make it possible to establish conditions that guaranteed
the cohesion and dynamism essential to an enlarged Community.
This should be the aim of the negotiations. In the Commission
opinion they should be opened as soon as possible.
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THE CUSTOMS UNION
1. According to Article 9 of the EEC Treaty, the Community is
based upon a customs union. It is on this foundation that the
general objectives set out in Article 2 are gradually being achieved,
largely by means of the common policies.
The experience gained in the last few years of Community activities
confirms that the customs union is the key to the establishment and
the development of the Community.
Every precaution must therefore be taken to make sure that the
accession of new States interferes neither with the component
parts nor with the working of the customs union, and that the
negotiations and later the unavoidable transitional arrangements
do not result in the postponement of the decisions which the
Community still has to take before the customs union is fully
established.
(a) New dimensions
2. The accession of four new members would lead to a considerable
expansion of the volume of trade within the common market and
with non-member countries.
On the basis of the figures for 1968, intra-Community trade (exports
fob from each Member State to every other Member State) would
rise from $28 400 million for the Six to $41 200 million for the
enlarged Community.
For the same year, exports fob to non-member countries would rise
from $35300 million for the present Community to $43600 million
for the enlarged Community, and imports cif from non-member
countries would rise from $33 500 million to $46 400 million. These
figures show that enlargement of the Community would considerably
enhance its position as a major world importer (38%). The
expansion in the volume of its exports would be less (24%).
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of preferential trade which would result from the gradual elimination
of customs duties and other obstacles to trade within the enlarged
customs union. Although it cannot be expected that this expansion
would be as rapid as that experienced in the EEC between- 1958 and
1968 (from $6800 million to $28400 million), the obstacles to trade
having already been eliminated inside the EEC on the one hand
and inside EFTA on the other, it can be assumed that enlargement of
the customs union would contribute to economic expansion in
Western Europe.
(b) Abolition of obstacles to intra-Community trade
4. Obstacles to trade already eliminated in the Community at the
date of accession would have to be eliminated from trade between
the old and the new members during the transitional period. This
applies of course not only to customs duties and quantitative
restrictions but also to charges with effect equivalent to customs
duties and to measures with effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions.
In the accession treaties, the new members would have to assume
specific obligations regarding the abolition of any measures of this
type at present known and in force on their respective territories.
Unilateral measures of the type adopted by the United Kingdom 
1964 with a view to restoring equilibrium in its balance of paYmentsl
would, of course, be ruled out.
State monopolies of a commercial nature2 would also have to be
adjusted as provided for by the Treaty of Rome.
5. The problems of manufactures based on certain agricultural
products , dealt with  inter alia  in Regulations Nos. 160/66 and
1059/68, also call for special attention: the system at present used
in the Community should be applied in dealing with the new
members as long as the latter do not fully apply the provisions
of the common agricultural policy for the products used as raw
materials.
1 15% surcharge applied even to imports from its EFTA partner countries.
2 This should also apply to the United Kingdom coal importing arrangements.
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extent to which the processing industries  of  certain candidates are
likely to compete with the food industry  of  the Six.
6. The accession agreements cannot rule out the use  of  safeguard
measures , which allow exceptions to the rule  of  free movement 
goods where there are economic difficulties  or  deflection  of  trade.
These measures, similar to those provided for in Articles 115 and 226
of  the EEC Treaty and elsewhere, should be laid down for the
transitional period by the accession treaties. The present members
of  the Community would  of  course have to constitute one unit for the
application  of  these measures after the expiry  of  the present
Community s own period  of  transition.
The increase in the number  of  member countries and the greater
diversity  of  their economies could mean more frequent resort to
safeguard measures unless it were possible to avoid these by the
co-ordination  of  commercial and industrial policies which will have
to be undertaken.
7. The elimination-even if it were gradual-of the obstacles to
trade in an enlarged Community could give rise to certain difficulties
in some "sensitive" industries which were singled out for special
treatment in the Kennedy Round.
The enlargement  of  the market should help to step up productivity
and encourage necessary adaptation, but the conditions 
competition must not be distorted. Difficulties can be foreseen
for instance, in the paper and paperboard industry, because of the
privileged access  of  the Nordic countries to the raw material and
the cartellization  of  the Scandinavian paper industry. The very
considerable divergences  of  commercial and industrial policy
between the United Kingdom and the Community in an industry
such as textiles could also raise delicate problems for the
Community s industry, which will in any case, as a consequence 
agreements recently concluded in Geneva, have to leave a growing
part  of  the market to imports from the developing countries.
Excessive differences in energy costS would prevent the Community
ferro-alloy industry from coping with Scandinavian competition.
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arising from the extent of American investment in certain areas
of British industry, such as the motor and agricultural tractor
industries.
8.  In  order to remedy the foreseeable difficulties in sensitive
industries such as those of which examples have been given above,
measures of industrial policy will have to be taken to facilitate
indispensable adaptation. If in exceptional cases co-ordination of
policies should not permit the causes of distortion to be eliminated,
special transitional or adaptation measures might prove to 
necessary.
( c)  Application of the common customs tariff  (CCT)
9. The present candidates for membership appear to be willing to
adopt the common customs tariff and the rules in this field
contained in the Treaty of Paris. I t is equally indispensable that
they should accept the provisions for its uniform application
vvhich will meanvvhile have been .adopted.
10. During the transitional period which they will be granted, the
special position of the new members in relation to the present
members of the Community will inevitably pose delicate problems.
These difficulties would be greatly reduced if the pace at which the
common customs tariff is introduced and that at which the mutual
adaptation of customs duties is implemented were fixed in such a
way as to limit the possibilities of deflection of trade.
11.  Pari passu  with this action, and for the same length of time, the
conditions under which the new members would relinquish the
EFTA tariff arrangements would have to be determined from the
point of view of the Community s interests.
12. The application of the common customs tariff by the
United Kingdom would mean a fundamental change in trading
conditions between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth
Commonwealth preferences being replaced by Community
preferences. For this reason the British decision to accept the
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reached in the course of the 1961-63 negotiations (association of
certain Commonwealth countries and territories in Africa and
the Caribbean, far-reaching commercial agreements with India
Pakistan and Ceylon).
The problems raised by the relations of an enlarged Community with
the countries of the Commonwealth and the possible introduction
of a generalized preference system for the developing countries will
be dealt with in Chapter 6 of this Annex.
13 . Lastly, by declaring its willingness to accept the CCT as it
emerges from the Kennedy Round, the United Kingdom appears to
be prepared to drop its request for nil duties for various products
which had given rise to difficulties in the previous negotiations. The
question arises however, of the pace at which the United Kingdom
would be prepared to bring its tariff closer to the common customs
tariff for the products concerned.
In this respect it should be remembered that the free movement
of goods within the Community calls for the removal of national
tariff quotas or their replacement by Community measures.
14. To sum up, in order that the enlargement of the Community
should not jeopardize the establishment of the customs union, the
arrangements involved and in particular the proposed transitional
period will have to be re-examined once the intentions of the
countries applYing for membership are better known.
When the exact import to be attached to their acceptance of the
common customs tariff comes to be examined, it would also be
advisable to study the situation with regard to certain products
or particularly important industries where acceptance of the CCT
cannot assume its full significance unless coupled with acceptance
of a certain number of basic options in commercial or industrial
policy.
(d) Problems connected with commercial policy
15. The accession negotiations should not delay the endeavour to
press forward the Community s implementation of a common
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negotiated with non-member countries.
The general approach now being worked out in this connection does
not seem to raise any major problems for the new members.
CHAPTER II
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
16. With the transitional period drawing to a close, the removal of
customs duties and the establishment of the common customs tariff
have enabled certain of the conditions for creating a single market
to be met. Experience shows, however, that in some sectors these
measures are far from sufficient to bring about a real development of
intra-Community trade and the effective use of the economies of
scale offered by a large market. Moreover, the relatively meagre
growth of interpenetration at company level is a further brake 
full exploitation of the opportunities offered by the Community
market.
The strengthening of the Community in the field of industrial
development postulates both an effort to promote the multi-national
regrouping of enterprises and at the same time an effort to confront
and concert national objectives to ensure that the influences exerted
by the public authorities or agencies in the various member countries
converge and supplement one another effectively. Without such
efforts it is unlikely that the advantages expected from the creation
of the single market will be obtained.
17. These considerations, which help to define the features of an
economic union conducive to industrial development, have not as yet
been incorporated in actual Community decisions. General policy
1 See "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European
Communities" (Cmnd. 3301), paras. 38 to 40.
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in the .second Medium-term Economic Policy Programme, and for
technology in the Decision of 31 October 1967; these policy lines
serve as guidelines for work currently in hand in the Community.
The energy sector raises special problems for the Community in
view of its dependence on external sources of supply, the importance
of this point in the traditional activities and the political sensitivity
of this sector in most of the member countries. The Community is
preparing to determine general policy lines in the sector.
(a) Industrial policy
18. The complete removal of obstacles to trade is one of the
prerequisites for the Community industries to be able to
. derive more profit from the advantages of a large market. The
development of these industries can nevertheless be ensured only by
the creation of a privileged legal, administrative and financial
framework at European level.
(i) Establishment of the single market in certain sectors
19. Experience gained during the transitional period has shown
that the removal of customs duties and the establishment of the
common customs tariff not only fell short of what is needed to
establish a single market in certain industrial sectors but did not
even lead to a real development of intra-Community trade in the
industries concerned, which include advanced technology and certain
other industries that produce capital goods for public or private
enterprises which provide a public service and are therefore subject
to State influence.
The continued division into national markets results not only from
the influence of Governments on those who use the products of these
industries, but also from the large part played by the State in
financing the design and manufacture of the products themselves.
The implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning public
contracts cannot without a concerted policy for public orders ensure
S. 9/10 - 1969the effective opening of the market in sectors as important as
nuclear power, aeronautics, space, computers, conventional heavy
electrical equipment communications equipment railway
equipment, etc.
(ii) A statute for companies
20. There will have to be a common legal framework for the statute
of companies if industry is not to continue to suffer because the
diversity of legal systems' in the various countries still allows
disparate conditions of competition and obstacles to the movement
of production factors across frontiers. Company law should
be adapted and if necessary supplemented to encourage
cross-frontier mergers or the founding of companies that operate
in all the Member States. Steps that could be taken in this
direction include the introduction of a statute for the "European
company, arrangements for the international mergers referred to in
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, and the harmonization of company
law on the protection of interests of members of companies and
third parties would constitute relevant action.
Although the British system of company law is in a number of ways
different from the continental systems (capital does not serve as a
guarantee in the same way, the structure of management is different
and so is the function of the Annual General Meeting), it appears
that the protection of interests of members and third parties (EEC
Treaty Article 54(3 g)) is not so different that it could cause serious
difficulties when Britain joins the Community.
The present lines under consideration for the "European company
provide for the establishment of a new law independent of municipal
law. For this reason no difficulties are to be feared if further
countries join the Community.
The obvious economic advantage of creating a "European company
in the enlarged Community justifies the hope that British law will
not constitute a further obstacle, since the Government of the
S. 9/10 - 1969United Kingdom has declared its readiness to modify its legislation
to this end. 1
(iii)  Patents
21. In the field of industrial and commercial protection, there will
have to be a European law on patents, trade marks and designs.
Britain and the other candidate countries are already taking part
with the Member States of the Community and other European
countries in drafting a Convention on a European system for the
grant of patents.
The accession of the candidate countries will make it possible for
them to participate in a second Convention on the subject, currently
being drafted in the Community. I ts aim is to determine uniformly,
but for the purposes of the Community alone, the effects of protective
entitlements granted under the Convention on a European system
for the grant of patents.
(iv) The structure of industry
22. The Commission has already submitted the first proposals for
the elimination of certain obstacles hampering co-operation and
concentration of enterprises with their registered offices in the
Community. These proposals will have to be supplemented to
remove the obstacles of all kinds which hamper the founding of
Community multi-national companies. With regard to structural
adjustments, national policies must be co-ordinated if there is to be
at least some degree of coherence among them. Britain for its
part has for two years been making a significant effort to improve
the structure of its industries and has for this purpose set up the
Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC). The specific aim of
this organization is to help British industry improve its structure.
One of its tasks is to accelerate the process of concentration and so
to improve the productivity and competitivity of British industry.
Since it was set up, this organization has already a certain number
1 See "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European
Communities" (Cmnd. 3301), paragraph 36: "Com.iderable amendment of our national law
might eventually be involved ...
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that Britain and the other candidate countries are ready to take part
in elaborating a Community policy in this sphere.
(v) Investments by non-member countries
23. A significant proportion of American investment finds its way
to Britain because of the traditional relations existing between
Britain and the United States. Accession is likely to strengthen
this trend, making it even more necessary to co-ordinate closely the
policies of all the States in the enlarged Community on foreign
investment.
(vi) The special problems of steel
The problems raised by the accession of the candidate countries
mainly concern Britain, whose production in the steel industry 
slightly under a third of Community production.
1.  Special adaptation problems
24. In the case of steel, acceptance of the price rules (Article 60
and implementing provisions) will mean a change in the British
systems. The procedures for these changes should be settled during
the negotiations.
25. In transport, the ECSC Treaty rules serve mainly to ensure
non-discrimination, a sufficient knowledge of transport rates for the
application of the provisions in Article 60 (price-lists, calculation of
prices, alignment), the establishment of international through rates
and the harmonization of transport conditions.
In this case, too, the specific procedures by which Britain will
implement these rules will have to be defined, particularly in
view of the present organization of transport in Britain.
In addition, the existence of a sea passage for all transactions
between Britain and the present Community adds a further
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the transport and the prices of products.
Particular attention should therefore be paid to knowledge 
, maritime freight rates and also to their publication, a point which
raises serious technical difficulties.
2.  The functioning 01 the Common Market in an enlarged Community
26. Apart from questions of scale, the effects which integration of
the British steel industry will have on the functioning of the Common
Market present the following features:
In steel, the implementing provisions of the 1967 Iron and Steel Act
will gradually centralize the entire responsibility for steel in the
British Steel Corporation (BSC) which will moreover be acting under
the Ministry of Power. Only a small fraction of steel production
remains in private hands.
The system of ownership in the industry will not be affected (ECSC
Treaty Article 83). However, the economic importance of the steel
industry in the United Kingdom and the differences between the
internal structure of the steel companies and that of companies in
the corresponding industry in the ECSC might well raise problems
of balance in the matter of competition.
27. Independently of the specific problems which may be raised by
the size, internal structure and functioning of Britain s nationalized
enterprises, it should be remembered that Articles 66 and 67 of the
Treaty of Paris contain provisions which could prevent the dominant
position of a public or private enterprise in the Common Market
from being used for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Treaty.
28. To sum up, it appears that the problems to be solved in steel
are mainly a matter of elaborating measures under which a few very
large undertakings could be integrated into the common market in
an orderly fashion.
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(i) Recent trend
290 The trend in science and technology since September 1967
shows three main changes, two  of  which are satisfactory whereas the
third is a source  of  concern.
First, the Community institutions have had occasion to clarify their
attitude on certain desirable lines  of  technological development in
Europe and . have already taken several decisions. Thus, in the
Resolution  of  31 October 1967, the Council, the Representatives 
the Member States and the Commission expressed their resolve 
launch a vigorous policy to revitalize and promote scientific and
technological research and industrial innovation. They likewise
decided to carryon with various activities calculated to improve
and harmonize the general conditions that foster research and
innovation and to explore the scope for co-operation in new areas.
The work stemming from this decision is in progress and should
enable the Council to take further decisions very soon.
Secondly, the Community countries have made very definite
advances as regards stepping up their research efforts. In spite
of  the lack of recent statistical data, it really looks as though the
gap between the United Kingdom and the Community countries
as shown by the 1963 figures, is tending to shrink appreciably.
30. Against this, the past two years have been particularly difficult
for Community action and international co-operation. In both the
nuclear and the space fields, the Community countries have been
incapable, either as a .
group  of  six or in a wider framework, of
agreeing on programmes  of  any considerable size likely to lead
in the medium term to industrial applications.
31. It must be added that the surveys and discussions  of  the last
two or three years have aroused a far clearer awareness  of  the need
for international co-operation.
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involved; it would be foolish to suppose that the pooling of national
resources and expenditure would automatically bring about a
commensurate improvement in technological progress. The
contributions by the various States in money and manpower
would only be really meaningful to the extent that the Community
countries succeeded in defining and carrying out a common
technology policy. Yet it is only through such co-operation that
Europe will be able to improve its competitive power versus the
United States and Japan by strengthening the technological
foundations of its enterprises.
32. The chief technological development problems are encountered
at allievels..:.-the State, the Community and, after other countries
join, the enlarged Community. One need only recall the piecemeal
efforts, the precariousness of commitments, the question of outlets
the inadequate links between firms and research projects, and so on.
The entry of the United Kingdom would not alter the nature of the
problems or of the obstacles to their solution. On the other hand
it would considerably alter the Community s scope for action.
The enlarged Community would by its very size afford a still better
framework for the implementation of a Community research and
development policy of international range and would make it
easier to co-ordinate the attitudes of the countries represented in the
various international agencies or organizations where the Six and the
applicant countries are preponderant. It is therefore in the light of
the greater chances of co-ordinated action in an enlarged Community
that the quantitative contribution in human and material resources
which the United Kingdom can bring to the Community s overall
potential should be appraised.
33. The proposals prepared by the Working Group on Scientific and
Technical Research Policy concerning certain specific fields, which
are now under discussion at the Council, are a first step on the road
to new co-operative projects. An agreement on these proposals
would be of major importance from both the political angle (by
manifesting the Governments' intention to work together) and the
technical angle (by opening up the way for new experiments in
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kind should be sought as quickly as possible, particularly as it is
likely to concern non-member countries, and should not be delayed
by the procedures involved in negotiations on admission to
membership.
(ii) New prospects in an enlarged Community
34. The development of effective co-operation in the Community
presupposes:
(1) That the duplication of programmes and projects will be
gradually cut back by systematic confrontation of the various
countries' programmes and budgets; next, that the scientific
programmes will be dovetailed and the technological tasks shared
out; the dovetailing process must cover activities carried out both
in the me:r.nber countries and in international agencies;
(2) That scientific and industrial projects will be launched
simultaneously in sufficient number to achieve an optimum
Community ratio between the contributions and interests of the
various countries taking part;
(3) That firms or groups of firms will be associated in the preparation
implementation and further development of the various countries
and the ComlT.tunity s technological programmes;
(4) That the conditions under which, in different countries, the
State collaborates with industry in research and technology (State-
aided contract machinery, association of State and industry, etc.
will be harmonized;
(5) That bilateral scientific and technological agreements concluded
between States will be compatible with the Community s interests;
(6) That scientific and technical personnel will be trained or retrained
to give them greater mobility within the Community.
The accession of the applicant countries, and more especially of the
United Kingdom, will give a new perspective to the problems of
science and technology which have to be studied in the light of work
planned or under way in the Community.
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should therefore be to obtain agreement-with due regard to what
has already been achieved in the Community-on the implementing
of a common policy for technological research and development,
with as its main plank the pooling of resources in brainpower and
money within the context of determining objectives and programmes
decided upon jointly.
(iii) Specific nuclear research problems
a) United Kingdom
36. Since the second world war the United Kingdom s drive to
develop its nuclear potential has been sustained and vigorous.
Its basic heavy equipment-an isotope separation plant, 3.1 research
reactors, 29 power reactors with an installed capacity of 5 353 MWe
at the end of 1969 (as against 21 power reactors with an installed
capacity of 3 191 MWe in the Community) and its reprocessing
plants-give the UK a power which is still as great as that of the
entire Community. The important work in progress on breeder
reactors deserves special mention.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom has at its disposal a real surplus
of scientists and engineers who have specialized in nuclear work
particularly since the staff cuts carried out in the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority (31 653 employees in 1968 as against
40000 in 1961). For a long time, however, British scientists and
engineers had been playing a leading part in the nuclear development
of a number of other countries.
The UKAEA has considered it advisable to adopt a plan for the
gradual and partial redirection of its atomic personnel towards
non-nuclear research; it also has to face another problem, that of the
relatively high average age of its scientific and technical personnel.
37. Now that the Community is reviewing its nuclear policy, certain
questions arise concerning possible participation by the United
Kingdom.
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contains no clause binding any member country to make available
to the others the knowledge it possesses at the time of its joining
the Community; only knowledge acquired subsequently has to be
pooled. The United Kingdom could therefore in theory sign the
Treaty as it stands and give no information whatsoever to its new
partners. However, an issue arises which was already broached in
the earlier negotiations: on joining the EAEC the United Kingdom
would have access not only to the Community s installations and
knowhow, but to those of the individual member countries, made
available to the Community through contracts of participation and
association (the national share in which is more than 60010). It
would thus be no more than fair if the United Kingdom were to
make some contribution; the nature, as well as the manner in which it
should be made, would have to be negotiated.
United Kingdom participation in the Community s future research
and development programme (due to take effect as from 1 January
1970), obviously depends on the general nature of that programme.
It must be borne in mind that the Community has decided to
continue participating until at least 31 March 1973 in the Dragon
project, an international project based in England which is an
example of successful technical co-operation between the Community
the United Kingdom and the other member countries of the
European Nuclear Energy Agency.
b) Other countries
38. Norway has a limited nuclear potential, comprising four
research reactors, and notably the Halden reactor, in the operation
of which certain Community countries participate. Norway is
likewise linked to the IAEA by various agreements and the bilateral
Norway-United States agreement has been transferred to the IAEA
for the implementation of safeguards and controls.
39. Denmark has a highly-reputed institute of theoretical physics
and a nuclear centre at Ris6 equipped with three research reactors.
The bilateral Denmark-UK agreement and the Denmark-USA
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implementation of safeguards and controls.
40. Ireland has no atomic plant.
41. The conclusion prompted by this brief review of the problems
arising in this sector from enlargement of the Community is that the
admission of the United Kingdom would:
(1) Strengthen the enlarged Community scientific nuclear
potential;
(2) Alter the conditions of both the internal and the external nuclear
market, because of the essentially private nature of the British
industry;
(3) Strengthen the Community s competitive position on the world
market through association of British firms with continental.firms;
(4) Be an important factor in the development of general, other than
nuclear, research.
It is clear that for an enlarged Community, the United Kingdom
experience in the field of isotope separation, by the gaseous diffusion
and the centrifuging processes, would constitute not only a technical
and economic but also a political advantage.
( c) Energy policy
42. As regards energy, the United Kingdom and the Community
are in a fairly similar situation in many respects. Furthermore, one
of the essential features of that situation, namely the pronounced
and growing dependence on external supply sources, is shared 'with
the other applicant countries.
The similarity of the current situations and of the lines along which
they are developing gives rise to policies that are relatively
comparable in their principles and their general pattern. In
particular, it will be observed that the guidelines for the British
energy policy are fundamentally no different from those proposed
by the Commission.
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concerning entry should not run into insuperable obstacles in the
energy field.
43. In preparing its "First Guidelines fpr a Community Energy
Policy , submitted to the Council on 18 December 1968, the
Commission took as its basis the work accomplished by the three
former Executives.
The results of that work were the Protocol of Agreement on energy
problems concluded by the Governments of the Member States on
21 April 1964 and the Council's decision of 10 July 1967 taking note
of the tabling of the Commission s first memorandum on the
Community s policy concerning oil and natural gas.
The United Kingdom Government, for its part, last defined its
energy policy in the "Fuel Policy" White Paper of November 1967.
(i) Summary comparison of the energy economies
44. The energy supply and demand situation in the Community and
in the United Kingdom calls for a few very general comments.
The United Kingdom s overall energy requirements are constantly
rising, but more slowly than the Community 1.5% a year as
against 4.7% during the last ten years. But the British
consumption figure is still distinctly higher than the Community
average, the gap being about 50% at the present time.
In the Community, domestic production covers 39% of requirements
as against 53% in the United Kingdom. On both sides the balance
is made up almost entirely of imported oil. Unlike the United
Kingdom, however, the Community imports more in the form of
petroleum and considerably less in the form of refined products
as well as exporting more of them.
Most of the United Kingdom s domestic production consists of
coal (90%). Natural gas still occupies only a minimal position, but
its use is expanding more rapidly than in the Community. Nuclear
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domestic production (6.5%).
The Community, on the other hand, has a wide variety  of  domestic
resources , coal accounting for only 55%  of  the total. Lignite, oil
hydroelectric energy~negligible in the UK-and natural gas make
up the remainder, nuclear energy still plaYing only a very modest part. 
Both sides, however, place a great deal of confidence in this new
energy form as a means  of  offsetting the shortfall in native fossil fuel
resources.
45. It must be noted that of  the other countries seeking admission
Norway has abundant water power resources which cover nearly
two thirds  of  its total energy consumption. Ireland and Denmark
on the other hand, lack resources  of  their own.
(ii) The energy policy s general objectives and framework of action
46. The objectives proposed for a common energy policy in the light
of  that sector s specific features are set out in the 1964 Protocol.
They include the equalizing  of  the conditions  of  competition between
the different energy sources and in relation to enterprises outside the
Community, and the protection of consumers' interests.
47. The framework  of  action outlined in the First Guidelines for a
Community Energy Policy is designed to create the requisite
conditions for medium-term estimates and planning, longer-term
forecasts and, when necessary, intervention measures in the event
of  supply difficulties. These various categories  of  measures do  not
represent new departures, as some  of  them have already been in
operation in certain sectors for a number  of  years. Their general
application should not cause difficulties in the negotiations on
admission, especially if it is remembered that, by reason of the fact
that its energy industries are under public ownership, the United
Kingdom has facilities that do not exist in all the Community
countries.
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Community-wide character was confirmed by the setting up  of  the
ad hoc  Committee on Security of Supply, established by the ECSC
Council' s decision  of  3 May 1966. Hence the countries seeking
admission would have to concur in this scheme.
(iii) Establishing the common energy market
48.. The setting up  of  a common market in the energy sector implies
the implementation  of  measures already laid down by the Treaties
with regard to the free movement  of  goods and freedom 
establishment.
As regards the rules  of  competition  more  particularly, this will
mean ensuring access, without discrimination, to the supply sources
determining a specific notification procedure for firms' merger
projects in the oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel sectors, and taking
measures whereby  posteriori  information will be provided on
prices actually obtaining on the market for the various forms 
energy. The adoption  of  the measures referred  to  above would
entail deviation from the provisions  of  the Treaties. It will likewise
be necessary to discuss with the Member States the expediency of
harmonizing their arrangements concerning price policy and 
ensuring a high degree  of  transparency in the energy market
conditions.
49. For coal, Article 60(2)  of  the ECSC Treaty and the decisions
stemming therefrom contain provisions concerning the publication 
price lists and conditions  of  sale. Acceptance of the ECSC Treaty
provisions in this field will necessitate changes in the British system
which in part uses delivered prices, and in certain cases area prices
but has no generally published prices. The same applies to carriage
rates.
50. As to indirect taxation, the aim should be  to  attain harmonized
application  of  the tax on value added, harmonization  of  the specific
energy-consumption taxes, and harmonization  of  the specific taxes
on petroleum products.
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(1) A Community-level supply programme, more especially for
hydrocarbons and nuclear fuel;
(2) Supervision and guidance of capital investments 
in the energy
sector;
(3) Reorganization of the energy industries.
52. As regards the commercial policy on energy, hydrocarbons and
nuclear fuel, the United Kingdom s entry might occasion certain
difficulties, particularly in the hydrocarbons sector, because that
country is linked, by special agreements, with certain crude oil
producing or mainly refining countries.
In the case of coal, the proposed co-ordination of the national import
programmes might present some difficulties for the applicant
countries, notably the United Kingdom, which 
reserves its own
market for home-produced coal.
53. The provisions concerning the notification of investment
projects in the coal and nuclear industries should be extended to
the other forms of energy. The extension of this procedure should
not give rise to any particular difficulties, bearing in mind the
structure of the energy industries in the United Kingdom.
54. The operation of aid systems for coal was already provided for
by the 1964 Protocol and was implemented by Decisions Nos. 3/65
and 1/67. At first sight, and subject to adjustments on particular
points, it does not appear that in this field there 
should be any great
difficulty in arriving at a common standpoint with the United
Kingdom, whose concerns are on the whole much the same 
as those
of the Community.
As to hydrocarbons, the remedy for the disparity in conditions of
competition between the Community enterprises and the big
international companies would be to apply fiscal measures and
to stimulate the search for and exploitation of crude petroleum
by Community firms.
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comparison with oil companies in other non-member countries
in a less favourable position than the Community s enterprises
especially as regards the fiscal handicap.
Regarding nuclear fuels, the basic requirement of an energy policy
consists in possessing or at least having reasonably guaranteed
access to resources. In this respect, the United Kingdom has:
(1) Financial interests in natural uranium production in Canada
South Africa and Australia;
(2) A gaseous diffusion plant for enriching uranium, at Capenhurst
which is being enlarged at the present time and will probably further
increase its capacity by use of the centrifuging system.
Assuming negotiations start in the near future, the Community
countries' access to these resources could be arranged at the time of
revising Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty.l As far as isotope
separation is concerned, the question of other Community countries
participation in the Anglo-German-Dutch project must be studied
from the angle of the industrial problems it raises.
(d) Safeguards and controls
55. In the nuclear field, it should be pointed out that the
interpretation of the EAEC Treaty provisions on the Euratom
safeguards and controls as applicable to British military
installations, came under discussion during the 1962 negotiations.
There is an arrangement between the Community and the French
Government on this point which might constitute a useful precedent.
Acceptance by the British Government of the International Atomic
Energy Agency inspection of certain British installations or imports
raises problems similar to those raised by the negotiations on the
Non-proliferation Treaty. These problems do not appear to be
insuperable.
1 Provided for in Article 76 of the Euratom Treaty.
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AGRICUL TURAL POLICY
(a) Quantitative and qualitative changes in the basic data
concerning agriculture in an enlarged Community
56. Compared with the natural and structural production potential
of agriculture in the present Member States, that of the four
applicant countries is relatively small.
Agricultural area would be about 300 /0 greater in a ten-member
Community than in the Six. Since the average farm holding in
Britain and Denmark is larger than in the Six, the number of holdings
(with one hectare or more of agricultural area) would increase only
by some 20%. The increase in numbers employed in agriculture
would be even less  (16010).
Farms, more especially in Denmark but in the United Kingdom and
Ireland too, are run on relatively rational lines and noted for high
productivity. This comes out also in the figures for the value of
production and value added by agriculture in these countries:
whereas the value of production in the "Four
is  230 10  of that
of the Six, the value added per person employed in agriculture
in the Four (3000 u. ) is more than 900 u.a. higher than in
the Six (2075 u.
Consequently, agriculture s contribution to the aggregate national
product of the Four (nearly 4.6%) is relatively high when compared
with the proportion of farm labour in the total labour 
force (5.
while in the Six its contribution (7. ) is much lower when compared
with the percentage of the labour force employed (150/0
57. As for the supply of farm products, the situation of the Six
will not be appreciably altered by the accession of the Four, if one
may judge from the supply. situation in 1967/68.
1 See table annexed to this chapter (p. 80).
S. 9/1 0 - 1969Whereas self-sufficiency in the Six averages nearly 90%, the figure
for the Ten would be around 85%. This slight difference arises
from the fact that in the Four there are two small countries with
agricultural surpluses (Denmark and Ireland) and one large
importing country (United Kingdom).
58. The biggest changes in self-sufficiency in individual products
(on the basis of 1967/68 figures) would be as follows:
Decreases
Wheat
Rice
Sugar
Fruit
Vegetables
Mutton and lamb and meat of goats and kids
Butter
Cheese
Oils and fats
Increases
Feed grain
Beef and veal
Poultrymeat
Pigmeat
Six
112.
100.
104.
89.
102.
84.
111.11
102. 71
41.8
78.
88.
97.
100.
Ten
97.
85.
83.
81.6
98.
58.
91 .
99.
40.
79.
97.
100.
103.
It is mainly in cereal-based livestock products, then, that self-
sufficiency in the Ten would be higher.
The first figures available for 1968/69 indicate that for the Six and
the Four alike self -sufficiency in most products is likely to increase
further and along more or less the same lines.
1 Provisional figures.
S. 9/10. 1969The degrees of self-sufficiency may in future undergo certain changes
to the extent that implementation of the common agricultural policy
has repercussions on the volume of production in the enlarged
Community.
59. In the matter of prices and price ratios at producer level, the
prices ruling in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are
fairly low compared with the single prices applied in the Six-leaving
aside the basically different .support system for British farming.
Norway, on the other hand, has relatively high producer prices.
Producer price ratios in the Four are also different from those found
in the Six.
60. The following conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of
changes in the basic data:
(i) Those rules (especially those relating to market organization
price policy and financing) which are largely determined by the
supply situation will not come up against a fundamentally changed
situation once the Community has been enlarged, even if some
adjustment might be advisable for a few products.
(ii) Adoption of the common agricultural policy and the price ratios
now fixed for the Six could lead to changes in the pattern 
production in the new member countries because of their different
price ratios. Assessment of the possible consequences of any such
changes could be profitably attempted only in co-operation with
the countries concerned.
(b) Special problems of candidate countries
61. Application of the common agricultural policy, as worked out
by the Community, to countries whose agricultural policies. have
been different in many respects may confront these countries
with certain specific problems, quite apart from the financial
question. 
S. 9/10 - 1969(1) United Kingdom
62. A comparison of farm prices in the EEC and producer prices in
the United Kingdom shows that prices are sometimes higher
sometimes lower, and that for certain products these differences are
considerable.
Since the United Kingdom will have to fall in line with the generally
higher Community prices and different price pattern there will, as
pointed out above, be problems of adjustment.
Moreover, the United Kingdom has guaranteed prices for some
products for which no guarantees are given under the common
agricultural policy (eggs, mutton and lamb, potatoes, wool).
63. The application of the EEC price level and price system for
farm products (involving abandonment of the deficiency payments
system, the application of levies to products imported from non-
member countries and paYment for goods imported from the EEC
at the internal market price) is bound to mean higher consumer
prices for a number of important foods. There is unlikely to be
any serious price change for other foods, notably drinking milk
fruit, vegetables and mutton and lamb, and there may even be a
drop in price for some others (eggs and potatoes).
Various inquiries into this question show that, generally speaking,
the increase in the cost of living can be put at about 3.5%.
64. The British farmer seems to attach great importance to the
annual price review, which is based on an analysis of the agricultural
situation made by the Government in consultation with
representatives of farming interests.
Apart from certain differences between the methods of compiling
data on the agricultural situation in the United Kingdom and the
Community, there are important differences in the consultation
procedure prior to the annual price fixing:
(i) In the United Kingdom consultation with the farming
organizations is official; in the Community contacts are purely
S. 9/10 - 1969informal. The Community procedure, on the other hand, includes
reference to the European Parliament of price proposals submitted
by the Commission to the Council;
(ii) In the United Kingdom the object of the exercise is to determine
guaranteed producer prices generally ensured by means of
deficiency payments, so that market prices are not affected
while the Community fixes target prices for the market, directly
affecting the economy in general. For this reason, any official
consultation of interested sections of the community could not
be restricted to farming organizations.
65. With regard to relations between the United Kingdom and
Commonwealth countries in the agricultural sector, two problems
seem to warrant special attention~the Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement and, more important, New Zealand butter.
66. The United Kingdom is bound by its obligations under the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to buy a specified amount of sugar
at a negotiated price. The current commitment is for approximately
1.8 million tons and the price is nearly 119 u.a. per ton of raw sugar
almost 50% above the current world price. In addition to this
quantity at a negotiated price, the British market absorbs a further
4 million tons of Commonwealth sugar at the world price. This
sugar enters the United Kingdom at a preferential rate of duty.
Commonwealth imports cover more than two thirds of the United
Kingdom s sugar requirements. The output of beet sugar, which
is strictly' controlled through a system of production licences, is
approximately 0.9 million tons.
A point to be mentioned here is that there is already a sugar surplus
in the Six. In an attempt to keep this surplus below 600000 tons
in a year with a normal harvest (this includes the French overseas
departments), the Commission has put forward various proposals
one of which was to readjust the basic quotas. The main object of
the measures proposed is to link the sum of the basic quotas to total
foreseeable human consumption of white sugar in the Community by
means of an annual review (until 1974) of the right to utilize the
existing basic quotas.
S. 9/10 - 1969The term of validity of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (it
expires at the end of 1974) roughly coincides with the period during
which the common organization of sugar markets still provides that
quotas limiting price and marketing guarantees be allocated among
the several Member States. Community arrangements for the
final period will thus come into force after the Commonwealth
Sugar Agreement expir~s.
67. The British market is virtually the only outlet for butter from
New Zealand, approximately 85% of whose butter exports go to the
United Kingdom. The trade agreement now in force expires on
30 September 1972 and stipulates that the minimum tonnage of
New Zealand butter to be imported. under quota arrangements is
170 000 tons. This tonnage covers more than one third of the
United Kingdom total requirements which amount to
approximately 470000 tons. Because butter production increased
to an estimated 65000 tons in 1969~70~the normal average had been
30 000 tons~total United Kingdom imports have been cut from
440 000 to 400 000 tons. Three Community countries (France
Belgium and the Netherlands) have quotas totalling 11 800 tons.
Norway, Ireland and Denmark have been authorized to supply
120000 tons and quotas for other countries total about 95 000 tons
(Australia accounting for 65 100 tons).
The present Community has structural surpluses now running at
400000 tons, and there is a tendency for them to increase.
The butter problem is complicated by the fact that the extension of
the common agricultural policy to the United Kingdom will mean
higher prices for the British consumer and possibly an increase in
home production of butter.
(2) Ireland
68. Agriculture holds a very special place in the Irish economy.
It employs almost 30% of the labour force and accounts for 20% of
the GNP.
S. 9/10- 1969Agricultural exports represent approximately  500 10  of total exports.
The United Kingdom is the largest single importer of Irish farm
products, but considerable quantities are also exported to the
Community and to the United States.
As far as agricultural structures are concerned, approximately 50%
of farms in the country asa whole are of 12 ha and over. In the
north and west, however, the percentage is not so high and here
structural adaptation problems are complicated by limited non-
agricultural resources.
69. For most products the alignment of Irish producer prices on
Community prices would result in increases of varying extent in
both producer and consumer prices. A slight drop, however, can
be expected in sugar beet, potato and egg prices.
(3) Denmark
70. Denmark has one of the most advanced and productive
agricultural economies in the world.
Agriculture gives employment to approximately  10  of the labour
force and accounts for somewhat less than 10% of the GNP. Almost
two thirds of Danish farm production is exported.
71. Generally speaking, Danish farm prices are considerably lower
than those applied within the EEC (1967/68). The alignment of
Danish prices on EEC prices would bring considerable additional
earnings to Danish agriculture, even allowing for an increase in
feed-grain prices and the suppression of certain subsidies.
The application of the common agricultural policy would also lead
to an increase in consumer prices.
(4) Norway
72. In Norway the fishing industry and forestry are of importance
as well as farming (contribution to GNP: farming 4%, forestry 1.6%,
fisheries 1.9%). Norwegian agriculture is carried on under
S. 9/10 - 1969 1"'1particularly unfavourable natural and structural conditions (the
area of the average farm is 5 ha); it could not survive in the northern
part of the country without substantial support from the State.
In its efforts to maintain a minimum of population in these areas
Norway has not as yet been able to dispense with aid of this kind.
Livestock products are the major item in agricultural production
(two thirds of total income 40% of which is accounted for by
milk products).
73. The alignment of Norwegian producer prices on Community
prices could lead to a reduction in the earnings of Norwegian
agriculture.
74. However, the lowering of producer prices would not mean 
reduction in consumers' expenditure. On the contrary, the removal
of consumer subsidies and the rise in prices for imported goods
would lead to a certain increase in consumer prices.
(c) Financial problems
75. As far as the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF is concerned
the enlargement of the Community will lead to increased
expenditure on refunds on exports to non-member countries
intervention on the internal market, and direct aid to agricultural
production in the new member countries. Expenditure will increase
despite savings on refunds now payable on exports from the Six to
the future member countries and on intervention expenditure now
necessary on the internal market of the Six for products which will
find a partial outlet on the markets of the future member countries.
For the Guidance Section of the EAGGF too, enlargement will mean
higher expenditure because of the increase in activity.
Subject to all the reservations required in such calculations, a
preliminary estimate of the order of magnitude of the sums which the
EAGGF will have to administer in 1973 gives the following figures:
S. 9/10 - 1969Estimate for 1973 (million u.
SIX TEN Difference between
Expenditure EAGGF SIX and TEN
II2
Guarantee Section 000 100 3 400 500 + 400 + 400
Guidance Section 285 500 (350) 700) (65) + (200)
Total 285 600 (3 750) 200) +(465) + (600)
1 Without implementation of the structures memorandu:rn.
2 With implementation of the structures me:rnorandum.
In this study 1973 is taken as the year when, hypothetically,
definitive arrangements for Community financing of all farm
products for which single markets now exist would be in operation
not only for the Six but also for the Ten. Estimates are based on
hypothetical quantities and hypothetical levels of expenditure.
For most products, quantities have been calculated on the basis of
production and trade trends over the last ten years, projected to
1973. For the principal products allowance is also made for the
most important changes likely to occur in the pattern of production
food consumption and trade as a result of the extension of the present
common agricultural policy to the applicant countries.
Forecasts for the level of expenditure have been based on the
Commission s price proposals for 1970/71 and current world prices.
76. Given the assumption that definitive arrangements for
Community financing of farm expenditure will have been introduced
by 1973, it should be noted that the Commission s proposals on
this matter are that, from 1 January 1971
(i) receipts from agricultural levies and charges will be included in the
Community s budget;
(ii) financial contributions from the Member States will be gradually
replaced by the Community s own revenue.
The problem of financing EAGGF expenditure should be seen, then
in the general context of the Community budget.
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.CHAPTER IV
OTHER PROBLEMS
RELATING TO ECONOMIC UNION
77. The enlargement of the Community raises other problems
arising either from the risk that competition may be disto;rted by the
special situation of the new members or from the need to ensure
that the new economic area of the Community is endowed with a
satisfactory organization.
How important the achievement of economic union is for the
development of the Community at the present juncture can be
appreciated from the following examples.
(a) Liberalization of capital movements
78. The establishment of an economic union calls for the gradual
introduction of arrangements under which capital has a high degree
. of freedom to move between the countries in the union.
Under the two directives adopted by the Council pursuant to
Article 67 of the EEC Treaty, the normal arrangement within
the Community is complete freedom from exchange controls for
various types of capital movement-particularly those connected
with direct investments, transactions in securities listed on stock
exchanges, export credits and "personal" transfers.
Since the war the United Kingdom has consistently maintained
restrictions on capital movements to and from countries outside the
sterling area. In October 1964 these restrictions were tightened up.
The British authorities have also introduced new arrangements
restricting freedom of capital movements within the sterling area.
To meet commitments arising from the Treaty and from directives
adopted by the Council, the new members will have to amend their
current rules and regulations. . In the case of the United Kingdom
this question should be tackled as part of a general study of the
country s economic, financial and monetary situation.
S. 9/10 - 1969(b) Harmonization of taxes
79. The establishment of a common market comparable with a
domestic market ~alls for considerable tax harmonization. The
new members would have to accept not only the directives already
adopted concerning turnover taxes but also current commitments to
adopt further directives in this field. I t would be advisable to
ascertain during the negotiations whether the new members are
prepared to join the present members in their efforts to achieve
harmonization in other areas of taxation such as excise duties and
the tax arrangements applying to capital movements, mergers and
corporate profits, with an eye to elimination of tax frontiers and
frontier controls inside the Community.
(c) Restrictive agreements and dominant positions
80. The entry of the United Kingdom and other applicant countries
can be expected to strengthen competition. The enlargement of
the Community, then, ought to diminish the importance and
effectiveness of restrictive agreements and dominant positions.
Enlargement could offer the advantage of making it possible to
increase the scale of firms while maintaining workable competition.
Since the new members would have no difficulty in accepting the
obj.ectives or implementing procedures of Community policy in
this field, the only problems which seem to arise are transitional
(e.g. the time-limit for notification of agreements).
(d) Technical obstacles to trade: industrial standards
81. Owing to the divergences between British standards-or those
of certain other applicants-and the standards now applied in the
Member States, one of the effects of enlargement would be an
appreciable increase in the significance of technical obstacles to
intra-Community trade. It may well be, however, that a bigger
market would constitute an incentive to overcome the difficulties
encountered so far, given the interest that the United Kingdom
has shown in this field.
9/10- 1-969Moreover, the British should not lose sight of the advantages of
adopting the decimal system in the United Kingdom.
( e)  Regional policy
82. The accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and
Norway to the Community should not, it seems, call for any changes
in the European Community s regional objectives.
Regional policies and regional problems in the prospective member
countries are not basically different from those in the present
Community countries.
The applicants' regional policies are like those of the Member States
in having the same objective-more balanced distribution of
development-and similar incentives to guide the siting of new
industry.
Norway s regional problem is the income gap between the more
developed regions and the outlYing regions, particularly in the
north, where special assistance has been granted to agriculture.
In the United Kingdom industry is concentrating heavily in certain
regions, particularly in the south around London, while other
regions are inadequately developed or are suffering from the decline
of their traditional industries. The United Kingdom, moreover, has
long experience of regional policy.
Ireland has embarked upon a policy of industrialization. The ai!ll
is to stimulate the economic development of the whole country
rather than redress the differences in economic development between
the various regions. Gross national product per head 
approximately the same in Ireland as in Italy, but the differences
between regions are less wide.
In the six-member Community it has been found that economic
union with its common policies and even the common market with
its threefold freedom of movement for workers, goods and capital
could not be established and would not confer the expected benefits
unless regional economic structures were resolutely harmonized.
S. 9/10 - 1969This should provide an additional incentive, once the process of
enlarging the Community begins, to pay particular attention to the
need for very active promotion and co-ordination of regional
policies at Community level.
(f)  Financing of social security
83. Approximately half the United Kingdom social security
expenditure is paid for by the Exchequer and half by flat-rate
contributions from employers and employees. In the Six, at least
three quarters of the money required is financed out of wage-related
contributions from workers and employers, the balance coming
from public funds. The British system may favour British firms
especially in industries where wages represent a large share of
value added, unless this advantage is outweighed by the heavier
burden of taxation.
This conclusion is, however, based on mere theory. Although the
conditions are in fact such that specific distortions can occur, it still
remains to be seen, industry by industry, whether the distortions are
serious enough to require elimination (Article 101 of the EEC
Treaty) .
The same problem will have to be studied in respect of the
Scandinavian countries also.
(g) 
Nordic labour  market
84. The existence of  unified labour market among the
Scandinavian countries will make it necessary to check how far
Community priority in access to emploYment would be affected 
the  de jure  and  de facto  situation in Scandinavia. Difficulties
might arise if, say, one or other of the Nordic countries remained
outside the enlarged Community or if no specific agreements on
the point were made with those Scandinavian countries which
did not become members.
S. 9/10 - 1969(h) Commonwealth Immigration Act
85. The Commonwealth Immigration Act regulates access to
employment and establishment in the United Kingdom for citizens
of Commonwealth countries. It is based on the principle of United
Kingdom law whereby citizens both of the United Kingdom and
Colonies and of Commonwealth countries rank as HBritish subjects
one application of this principle is that Commonwealth citizens can
acquire United Kingdom citizenship after five years' residence.
According to Mr. Wilson s statement in the Commons on 8 May 1967,
the British Government considers that, except as otherwise provided
in association agreements, for instance-the facilities granted
Commonwealth immigrants in the United Kingdom after accession
should not necessarily give them rights to enter the labour markets
. of other countries in the wider Community. On the other hand the
British Government does recognize that a problem exists regarding
priority in access to employment.
(i) Transport
86. Enlargement should not cause any difficulties beyond those
already encountered by the Six in building up a common policy for
road, rail and inland waterway transport. It would, however
create a new situation for sea and air transport, in view of the part
played by these modes of transport not only in trade with non-
member countries but also in the internal trade of the enlarged
Community. The possibility of Community action in these fields
is provided for in the Treaty of Rome, and it would be useful if
during the negotiations this point too could be examined.
(j) 
ECSC levy
87. The ECSC has resources deriving directly or indirectly from
the levy, part of which is available for such operations as the
enlarged Community might undertake.
S. 9/10 - 1969The countries which have asked to join the Community should
therefore contribute proportionately to these resources since they
would benefit from any such operations by the same token as the
Six benefit from them at the moment.
The biggest resources are the guarantee funds (100 million units of
account) and the special reserve (about 88 million units of account).
It is from these monies that credits are granted under Articles 54
and 56 of the ECSC Treaty and that workers' housing and the
interest-rate rebates for conversion credits are financed.
S. 9/10 - 1969B. Enlarged Community and
non-mem ber CountriesCHAPTER V
88. Enlargement of the Community by the accession of four
countries including the United Kingdom would have important
repercussions on relations with non-member countries. The
enlarged Community would. be by far the biggest importer in
the world, and its responsibilities, both inside and outside Europe,
would be substantially increased. Moreover, its greater weight
would be likely to expand considerably its ability to take action
at international level.
The most immediate problems concern relations with those member
countries of EFTA which cannot or do not wish to join the
Community and also relations with the Commonwealth countries
given the special links between them and the United Kingdom
and the existence of an association with African countries and
Madagascar. The problem of the Commonwealth cannot be
isolated from those raised by relations with the other industrialized
or less developed non-member countries.
The present chapter, then, after a brief review of the broad
consequences that enlargement of the Community will have on its
relations with non-member countries, is devoted to an examination
of the future relations between an enlarged Community and the
various classes of less developed countries and also between the
enlarged Community and those industrialized countries which do
not form part of Western Europe.
1. GENERAL EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT
ON RELATIONS WITH NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
89. Accession of the four countries seeking membership could turn
the Community, whose volume of external trade already exceeds that
of the United States, into the foremost commercial power in the
world, accounting for 25.6% of all international trade, as against
17.2% for the Six. Consequently the Community would play
vital part in the evolution of international trade.
$. 9/10 - 1969The Community s chief suppliers would experience a considerable
increase in their percentage of exports to the Community as a result
of accession of the new members (see table below).
However, the consequences to non-member countries must be
assessed with due regard to the stimulating effect which extension
of the Community might have on economic expansion in Europe.
In this connection the experience of the Six shows that the impact
of the intra-Community preference implicit in the customs union
may in quite large part be offset by economic expansion.
90 . Nevertheless, urgent appeals are to be expected from non-
members especially but not exclusively the Commonwealth
countries: they will be seeking either a further general reduction of
tariffs or preferential concessions or concessions on certain products.
91. If account is taken not only of the fact that the tariffs of the
new member countries and of the United Kingdom in particular are
generally higher than the CCT, but also of the outcome of the recent
negotiations in Geneva, the Community should be able to resist all
demands for a new overall reduction in tariffs, at least until
completion of its economic union puts it into a better position to
meet international competition.
Nevertheless, the requests of the Commonwealth developing
countries are sure to constitute an urgent problem if the
Community is enlarged.
2. RELATIONS
WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(a) General
92. The Community of the Six already bears heavy responsibilities
in the field of development aid through its association arrangements
with a large number of less developed countries, most of them in
Africa.
S. 9/1 0 - 1969Share of the Community in the external trade
of a selection of non-member countries
or areas in  1966  and  1967
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Countries or areas 1966 1967 1966 1967
in $m. in% in $m.
1 in %
in$m. in% in $m.
1 in %
United States
Total 25 550 28 745 29 899 147
Present
Community 4 125 16. 5 387 18. 5 264 17. 5 859 18.
Enlarged
Community 6342 24. 7 588 26. 7 318 24. 8 607 27.
Canada
Total 127 10 966 9 551 10 555
Present
Community 509 545 597 640
Enlarged
Community 164 12. 177 10. 768 18. 2 019 19.
Japan
Total 9 523 664 9 776 10 441
Present
Community 447 655 595 546
Enlarged
Community 700 974 991 10. 125 10.
Australia
Total 3 636 3 913 158 3 478
Present
Community 366 10. 426 10. 501 15. 456 13.
Enlarged
Community 104 30. 157 29. 134 36. 986 28.
New Zealand
Total 095 955 076 993
Present
Community 180 16. 117 11.8
Enlarged
Community 424 38. 347 36. 714 66. 639 64.
South Africa
Total 2 526 2 945 1 726 1 931
Present
Community 503 19. 611 20. 413 23. 410 21.4
Enlarged
Community 206 43. 1 350 45. 1 062 61.5 117 57.
S. 9/10 - 1969Share of the Community in the external trade
of a selection of non-member countries
or areas in  1966  and  1967  (continued)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
C:ountries or areas 1966 1967 1966 1967
in $m. in % in $m. in % in $m. in % in $:m. in%
Eastern Europe
Total 20 702 132 246 150
Present
Community 670 17. 612 20. 848 18. 240 18.
Enlarged
Community 4 882 23. 986 27. 737 27. 192 26.
Developing
countries
Total 900 700 300 600
Present
Community 469 21.2 029 21.6 642 30. 931 30.
Enlarged
Community 450 31.2 821 30. 699 43. 101 43.
Latin America
Total 740 290 040 030
Present
Community 2 137 21.9 296 22. 902 26. 902 26.
Enlarged
Community 2 997 30. 162 30. 227 38. 285 38.
10. Far East
Total 590 720 760 10 090
Present
Community 555 11.4 567 10. 252 12. 145 11.
Enlarged
Community 716 20. 661 18. 338 24. 2 238 22.
11. Middle East
Total 360 010 770 450
Present
Community 258 20. 298 21.6 605 33. 911 34.
Enlarged
Community 001 32. 987 33. 687 47. 131 48.
Note:  The data concerning the areas or,groups of countries from 4 (Australia) to 11 (Middle East) inclusive have been computed as "derived figures" in respect of the Community share (both
Six and Ten countries). i.e. Community imports  exports of these areas or groups of countries
and~Vice versa.
Sources:  OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics Bulletins. Series C, 1967.
International Financial Statistics, Vol. XXII, No. , June 1969.
S.  9/10 - 1969Enlargement would cause the Community to expand its activities in
the sphere of development aid either within or outside the
association framework. The wider responsibilities would be due
not only to the accession of new members with high living standards
but also to the fact that one of them, the United Kingdom, has in
the Commonwealth complex and often historic links with a large
number of less developed countries.
93. The Commonwealth problems were examined in detail during
the negotiations that were interrupted in 1963. The Commission
considers that the arrangements envisaged at that time may retain
some validity and should be examined case by case. The closer
links established between the EEC and certain Commonwealth
countries, the tariff cuts agreed in the Kennedy Round and the
autonomous suspensions of duty applied by agreement between the
EEC and the United Kingdom also help to simplify the problem.
The same applies to the reduction of the common customs tariff
envisaged for a number of tropical products including raw coffee
cocoa and palm oil, in the framework of the new Association
Convention with the African States and Madagascar (AASM).
If the Community accorded the developing countries tariff
preferences for their exports of manufactured and semi-finished
products, this would help avoid or offset most of the short-term
inconveniences which enlargement of the Community would entail
for certain countries inside or outside the Commonwealth. The
autonomous preferential concessions which the Community would
make would, of course, have to be reviewed or at least reassessed
in quantitative terms when new countries join.
(b) Effects of enlargement on relations with associated
countries
(AASM and Commonwealth countries with comparable economic
structure and comparable production) 
94. The Community s association arrangements concern at the
present time seventeen African States and Madagascar, all associated
under the Yaounde Convention, certain Commonwealth countries
s. 9/10 - 1969whose economic structure and production are comparable with those
of the AASM, and several countries or territories outside Europe
which are not independent.
A new member of the Community would be required to maintain
with the developing countries relations identical with those now
maintained with them by the Six. Conversely, the associated
developing countries would have to accord any new member the
same treatment as they already accord the Six.
In 1962 it was envisaged that the non-independent Commonwealth
overseas countries should be associated on the same terms as
the non-independent associated overseas countries or territories.
Correspondingly those independent Commonwealth! countries whose
structure and production are comparable with those of the AASM
would qualify for association with the enlarged Community.
In this connection it should be remembered that alongside the trade
clauses, financial and technical co-operation are a key element in the
arrangements for the association of overseas States, countries and
territories with the EEC. The aid given through the Community
represents an appreciable part of the total official aid (multilateral
and bilateral combined) which the Yaounde countries receive from
the Six. As an enlarged Community could not cease to give some
measure of Community aid in addition to the bilateral aid provided
by the Member States, new members would have to make their
contribution. This aid would be available to all the associates, for
manifestly it would not be possible, among countries of comparable
structure and comparable production, that one group should
benefit from technical and financial assistance while another did
not.
Such aid would moreover help to stimulate economic co-ordination
between associated countries, particularly for those countries that
have special links with various Member States.
However, it should be made clear from the outset that arrangements
on trade and financial and technical assistance could, apart from
their application to the Yaounde countries, be applied only to those
1 States in Africa south of the Sahara and in the Caribbean.
S. 9/10 - 1969Commonwealth developing countries which accepted the reciprocal
rights and obligations entailed in association arrangements with the
EEC: if any of them were unwilling to accept these terms, they
could have nothing beyond a trade agreement with the Community.
The benefits they could enjoy under such agreements could hot be
equivalent to those deriving from association agreements.
95. A word should be said in conclusion on the way in which wider
association arrangements might affect. the interests of the present
associates. Efforts would be made to attenuate any ill effects by
appropriate measures, with due regard to what the Yaounde
countries and the new overseas associates really do export to the
enlarged Community, and also to .any new arrangements made at
world level, for example under commodity agreelnents.
It is already clear that anything which is a sensitive commodity for
the economy of some present or future associate will require special
examination during the negotiations.
96. It must be borne in mind that the association arrangements
with the AASM and the three East African States which have just
been renewed will expire at latest on 31 January 1975; eighteen
months before the expiry of these Agreements, the Contracting
Parties are to examine the arrangements that could be adopted for
a further period.
(c) Relations with the Maghreb countries
97. The need to establish homogeneous Community arrangements
for all products traded with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria would
become greater should new countries-particularly the United
Kingdom~join the Six.
The difficulties which now beset the Community of the Six-
current or planned negotiations-in its efforts to grant preferences
to agricultural produce from the Mediterranean area would be eased
if the Community consumer market were widened by the accession 
orthem European countries.
$. 9/10 - 1969(d) Relations with the other developing countries
98. Enlargement of the Community, and a larger number of
associates would also raise problems in connection with the
other less developed countries for which association cannot be
conteD;lpla ted.
The impact of any extension of the preferences enjoyed by the
associated countries on the position of the other developing
countries, especially those in Latin America, on the markets of
the enlarged Community, will need to be carefully considered.
The remarKs made above concerning the implication of an enlarged
Community for the Yaounde countries also apply here.
Nevertheless, the grant of tariff preferences by the enlarged
Community and other developed countries should prove to 
an advantage for these countries and help them to accept the
consequences of wider European integration.
99. With reference more especially to the Commonwealth countries
of Asia, the agreement contemplated in 1962 could be re-examined 
the enlarged Community. It should however be noted that
these countries have already been granted certain concessions~
autonomous or contractual-by the Community in recent years.
These concessions have solved a number of the problems which
had been raised in the 1962 negotiations. The granting by the
industrialized countries-as planned under the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-of preferences
for manufactures and semi-manufactures from all the developing
countries could also help to solve the latter s problems.
Imports from Hong Kong pose a special problem.
100. In any case, the accession of new members should provide a
new impetus and enable a broader development policy to be drawn
up. In particular, this policy should be integrated in its' technical
financial and commercial aspects, should be adjusted from the
regional point of view and should help to facilitate the creation of
economIC groups.
$. 9/10. 1969101. In this connection, it would be desirable for the enlarged
Community to study any possibilities of taking Community action
for the benefit of the Latin American countries in accordance with
the guidelines recently drawn up by the Commission.
3~ RELATIONS
WITH THE OTHER NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
1022. The relations between an enlarged Community and the
developed Commonwealth countries, the United States, Japan,
the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe are discussed below.
(a) Canada, Australia, New Zealand
103. The United Kingdom Government has not stated that special
arrangements are required for the developed Commonwealth
countries, with the exception of New Zealand and its milk products.
This may be explained first of all by the fact that the relative
importance of exports from these countries to the United Kingdom
is diminishing, as the table below shows:
Exports from developed Commonwealth countries
to the United Kingdom
(as  of exports to all countries)
Canada 37. 16. 17. 13. 10.
Australia 54. 37. 26. 17. 12.
New Zealand 83. 67. 53. 48. 44.
I 1938
1953 I 1960 I 1963 I 1967
Moreover, the elimination of Commonwealth preferences once the
United Kingdom applies the common customs tariff will be made
easier by the results of the Kennedy Round.
S. 9/10 - 1969In these circumstances, the removal of Commonwealth preferences
should not present insurmountable difficulties if it takes place
progressively over a transitional period and so enables the necessary
adjustments to be made.
The long-term solutions to the problems of the main agricultural
commodities can be found only in a world context. If necessary
the Community could take further steps to bring to a successful
conclusion the efforts it was making in the Kennedy Round
to establish world agreements on trade in certain agricultural
commodities.
(b) The  United  States
104. Where the United States is concerned, an examination of
commercial problems alone would not be enough. For the
Community., whether it has six members or more, the United States
will be a partner which, because of its size, will be of exceptional
importance. The accession of several States, and of the United
Kingdom in particular, would mean that the Community could
hope, as a result of its increased dimensions, to have one day a
potential comparable with that of the United States or, at least
that the gap between Europe and the United States would not
grow wider. The Community would then have better chances of
putting the relations between Europe and America on a footing
of equality.
(c) Japan
105. Assuming enlargement takes place, Japanese exports to the
Community would-on the basis of the 1968 figures-rise from
$685 million to $1 264 million (or from 5.3% to 9.7% of Japan
total exports); imports from the Community would go up from
$737 million to $1 036 million (or from 5.7% to 8% of Japan s total
imports) .
The greater importance of relations with Japan would make it even
more necessary than before for the old and new members of the
Community to agree on a common commercial policy towards this
S. 9/10 - 1969country; the Community will, moreover, shortly be called upon to
examine the possibility of concluding a Community trade agreement
with it.
(d) USSR and countries of Eastern Europe
106. The tendency to establish closer economic links between the
Community and the countries of Eastern Europe . might 
strengthened by the enlargement of the Community: the enhanced
importance of the wider Community as a trading partner could
well induce the USSR and the other Eastern European countries
to take an objective look at the advantages that would stem from
contact with the Community.
Care would nevertheless have to be taken that the development of
trading relations with these countries did not take place in extended
order; if each of the old or new Member States tried to obtain
individual advantages, the consequences could be damaging for
the Community. For this reason, the elaboration of a common
commercial policy towards Eastern Europe should not be postponed
during the period of accession negotiations and should be accepted
by the new members. It does not, however, seem that enlargement
is likely to cause additional difficulties in this sphere.
Harmonization of the Member States policies towards the
Eastern European countries was begun a few years ago and the
lines followed have been much the same as those previously
adopted by the United Kingdom.
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